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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DNA CASES: A RE-APPRAISAL OF THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF STRICKLAND V.
WASHINGTON JUDGES
Albert E. Scherr*
The advent of forensic DNA evidence has made possible the prosecution of
many crimes that would otherwise be un-prosecutable or that would have been weak
cases, if prosecuted. At the same time, forensic DNA technology has raised very
substantial concerns about the reliability of evidence previously viewed as the gold
standard in proof. Wrongful convictions by the Innocence Project and others have
established that eyewitness misidentifications, false confessions, bad forensics and
mistaken guilty pleas occur. The much lesser known but still very troubling concern
is with the performance of defense counsel in cases in which the prosecution has
forensic DNA evidence. Anecdotal evidence from wrongful convictions suggest that
at least some lawyers are handling cases with DNA evidence or the potential for
DNA evidence so poorly that wrongful convictions are occurring.
This Article examines the intersection of sophisticated forensic DNA technology and the hands-off Strickland standard captured by an equally sophisticated
decisional architecture. It collects of several layers of empirical evidence: judicial
performance in over 300 ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) opinions; DNA exonerations in cases in which DNA was used or DNA testing was denied and DNA
cases in which a defendant raised an IAC claim, lost and was later exonerated.
The Article also tracks almost 50 cases in which the prosecution presented DNA
cases which resulted in either a complete dismissal, an acquittal at trial or a very
favorable plea offer.
The conclusion from the varied empirical evidence: judges are very often handling DNA IAC claims poorly. Strickland’s decisional architecture is failing. Judges
are over-relying on deference and presumption. They never assess what prevailing
professional norms are for handling DNA cases. Whether through inattentiveness or
* Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire School of Law. The origins of this article
were a two-year National Institutes of Health research grant on genetics, police investigation & the
Constitution (# R03 HG004036-1 and # R03 HG004036-2). Thanks to Jeanne Hruska and Steve
Jacobsen for reviewing drafts and to Brandon Garrett and Vanessa Potkin for pointing me in the
direction of good data. Additional thanks to the many lawyers who provided me with stories about
their DNA cases, good and bad.
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scientific illiteracy, they are creating an environment in which Strickland’s command to ferret out unjust results is subverted. The Article concludes by offering four
recommendations for improving that poor performance and for a more fundamental
inquiry into the effectiveness of Strickland itself.

(10) 55.2_SCHERR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/5/22 2:06 PM

IAC IN DNA CASES

529

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 531
I. STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON ........................................................ 536
A. How to Measure Counsel’s Deficiencies........................ 537
B. Resistance to the Adoption of Specific Guidelines ........ 538
C. Deference to Attorney Decision-Making ........................ 540
D. Double Deference in Federal Habeas Review ................ 541
E. Lack of Access to Counsel .............................................. 545
II. THE TYPICAL DNA CASE ........................................................... 548
A. The Summary Report...................................................... 548
B. Deconstructing the Summary Report .............................. 549
C. Implementing the Strategy .............................................. 551
1. Deciding Whether to Ask for Additional Testing ..... 551
2. Deciding Whether to Mount an Admissibility
Challenge .................................................................. 552
3. Preparation for Cross-Examination of
Prosecution’s Expert(s) ............................................. 553
4. Presenting One’s Own Expert Testimony ................. 553
D. Some Current Issues in DNA Litigation......................... 554
1. Complex Mixtures..................................................... 554
2. Laboratory Performance ........................................... 556
3. Probabilistic Genotyping........................................... 557
4. Transfer Issues .......................................................... 557
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF JUDICIAL INEFFECTIVENESS IN
IAC DNA CASES................................................................... 559
A. IAC DNA Cases ............................................................. 559
1. Prevailing Professional Norms.................................. 561
2. Deference and Double Deference ............................. 562
3. The Presumption when Counsel Chooses to
Forego a Defense ...................................................... 566
4. Failure-to-Test and Failure-to-Consult/
Hire-an-Expert Cases ................................................ 569
5. Lack of Availability of Counsel ................................ 573
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF MISTAKES AND SUCCESSES IN
DNA CASES .......................................................................... 575
A. The Evidence from Exonerations in Non-DNA Cases ... 577
B. Evidence from Exonerations in DNA Cases................... 581
C. DNA Exonerations in Testing-Requested Cases with
Failed IAC Claims. ........................................................ 584

(10) 55.2_SCHERR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

530

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

5/5/22 2:06 PM

[Vol. 55:527

D. Empirical Evidence that DNA Cases Are Winnable ...... 588
V. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................. 596
1. Consider Existing Standards............................................ 599
2. Prevailing Professional Norms in DNA Cases ................ 602
A. Obtain and Examine the Full Case File.................... 603
B. Engage in Preliminary Evaluation with Expert or
DNA-Experienced Lawyer ....................................... 604
C. Explicitly Consider Formally Retaining an
Expert for Trial Preparation ...................................... 604
D. Explicitly Consider a Request for Additional
DNA Testing ............................................................. 604
3. Dispense with Deference/Presumptions in
Evaluating an IAC Claim............................................... 605
4. If Requested, Require Post-Conviction DNA Testing .... 606

(10) 55.2_SCHERR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/5/22 2:06 PM

IAC IN DNA CASES

531

INTRODUCTION
In 1998 in Houston, Texas, the police arrested 16-year-old Josiah
Sutton for the sexual assault of a victim.1 They were investigating the
sexual assault of the victim at gun point by two men in the back of a
car.2 A few days after the assault, the victim had identified Mr. Sutton
and another teenager as the perpetrators of the assault as she was driving in her neighborhood.3
Upon arrest, Mr. Sutton agreed to provide his saliva and blood for
forensic testing. The DNA testing included Mr. Sutton as a suspect.
The testing excluded his friend in spite of the victim having identified
him.4
At Mr. Sutton’s trial, the jury heard evidence that semen from the
backseat of the car in which the assault occurred was an “exact” match
with Mr. Sutton and another unidentified male as well as the victim.5
According to the testimony from the Harris County crime laboratory,
the “exact” match meant that only 1 in 694,000 could have deposited
the semen there.6 The jury convicted Mr. Sutton of aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault, and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison.7
In prison, Mr. Sutton began to learn about forensic DNA evidence.8 He sought independent DNA testing and filed a motion for a
new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel.9 At an evidentiary
hearing, Mr. Sutton’s trial counsel said that he did not obtain independent DNA testing because, “(1) he informed appellant’s family he
would need more money for the analysis to be performed but they
failed to pay it; and (2) there were no unadulterated samples left for
independent analysis.”10 Two Sutton family members contradicted defense counsel’s testimony saying that his trial lawyer took the money

1. Ken Otterbourg, Josiah Sutton, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (AUG. 6, 2020),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3672
[https://perma.cc/SAG9-WYCK].
2. Id.
3. Josiah Sutton, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/cases/josiah-sutton/
[https://perma.cc/56CP-YQUF].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Josiah
Sutton,
CHRON,
https://www.chron.com/exonerees/stories/josiah-sutton/
[https://perma.cc/Q8XK-43AH].
8. Josiah Sutton, INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 3.
9. Id.; Sutton v. State, No. 14-99-00951-CR, 2001 WL 40349, at *1 (Tex. App. Jan. 18,
2001).
10. Sutton, 2001 WL 40349, at *1.
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and never told the family they needed to pay more.11 In addition, a
crime lab technician testified that an unadulterated biological sample
for DNA testing did still exist.12 The trial court denied Mr. Sutton’s
motion for a new trial, finding that defense counsel had not been constitutionally ineffective.13
On appeal, in applying the Strickland v. Washington14 standard
for resolving ineffectiveness claims,15 the Texas appellate court deferred to the trial court’s decision.16 It found that (1) counsel’s representation was not deficient; and (2) even if it was, Mr. Sutton was not
prejudiced.17 It noted:
Appellant’s counsel on appeal asserts the “independent DNA
analysis in this case is very important to the entire case and
the only viable defense available to defendant.” But in arguing that the absence of independent DNA analysis prejudiced
appellant’s case under Strickland, appellate counsel does not
produce any evidence of independent DNA analysis that
would vindicate appellant or raise questions about his innocence. Nor does counsel explain why there was any impediment to obtaining such an analysis before the hearing on the
motion for new trial. Likewise the State’s DNA evidence
which implicated appellant and led to the dismissal of
charges against others accused, is not seriously challenged.
In the absence of some showing from the record a negative
effect upon the appellant, the second prong of Strickland was
not met.18
In 2002, a state audit of the Harris County laboratory concluded
that “DNA technicians there misinterpreted data, were poorly

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
15. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687.
16. Sutton, 2001 WL 40349, at *1.
17. Id. at *2.
18. Id.
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trained[,] and kept shoddy records.”19 Shortly after the audit’s release,
the DNA laboratory was shut down for a time.20
Among those samples examined in the audit was that of Josiah
Sutton. The audit found that the population frequency estimate for the
crime scene sample was 1 in 8 among Black people, rather than the 1
in 694,000 provided for the trial. More dramatically, the audit found
that Mr. Sutton’s profile was incorrectly identified as matching the
crime scene sample. In fact, Mr. Sutton was excluded as a possible
contributor. He was exonerated after serving five years in prison.21
In 2006, the police arrested Donnie Lamon Young.22 His DNA
profile matched that of the crime scene sample.23 The victim was
shown a live line-up that included Mr. Young. She was not able to
identify him more than seven years after the sexual assault.24 Nonetheless, Mr. Young confessed to the sexual assault and pled guilty in
2007.25
*****************************
The Josiah Sutton case exemplifies many concerns with the criminal justice system. It highlights the exonerations produced by many
organizations like the Innocence Project.26 It reveals the stark reality
that types of evidence previously thought of as gold standards of proof,
confessions and eyewitness identification, were not as perfectly reliable as traditionally believed.
It also highlights the power and pitfalls of forensic DNA evidence. The advent of forensic DNA evidence has made possible the
prosecution of many crimes that would otherwise be un-prosecutable
or that would have been weak cases, if prosecuted.27 The DNA
19. Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, New Doubt Cast on Testing in Houston Police Crime
Lab, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/05/us/new-doubt-cast-on-testi
ng-in-houston-police-crime-lab.html [https://perma.cc/J8X9-CTLF].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Matthew Shaer, The False Promise of DNA Testing, THE ATLANTIC (June 2016), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/a-reasonable-doubt/480747/ [https://perma.cc/
M9LT-ZN2U].
23. Id.
24. Roma Khanna & Mike Glenn, HPD Makes Arrest in Iconic DNA Case, HOUS. CHRON
(June 22, 2006), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/HPD-makes-arrest-in-iconicDNA-case-1581308.php [https://perma.cc/9V4B-VAT3].
25. Shaer, supra note 22.
26. The investigation into the Sutton case was led by Dr. William Thompson, a lawyer and
professor at University of California-Irvine. Otterbourg, supra note 1.
27. Off. of Att’y Gen., Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology: Using DNA to Solve
Crimes, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/advancing-justice-through-dnatechnology-using-dna-solve-crimes [https://perma.cc/WL4N-E7X9] (updated Mar. 7, 2021).

(10) 55.2_SCHERR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

534

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

5/5/22 2:06 PM

[Vol. 55:527

evidence in the Sutton case significantly bolstered the strength of a
case that suffered from a shaky eyewitness testimony by the victim.
The victim’s original description to the police described a man who
was “short and skinny” while Sutton was 6 feet, 2 inches tall and 205
pounds and the captain of his high school football team.28 Yet, the lab
analysis of the crime scene sample revealed a mixture of three people,
a not uncommon circumstance in forensic DNA analysis and one
which continues to challenge DNA analysts across the country.29 It is
the misinterpretation of this mixture that led to the faulty identification
of an innocent man.30
These concerns about the reliability of eyewitness identifications
and confessions, as well as the imperfections of forensic DNA interpretations are now relatively well known, if not well addressed. The
much lesser known but still very troubling concern is with the performance of defense counsel in cases in which the prosecution has forensic DNA evidence. In Mr. Sutton’s case, his lawyer did not, in the end,
hire an expert or even informally consult with one to explain to him
DNA science or the problems with mixtures.31 There was no evidence
that his lawyer had training, knowledge, or experience handling DNA
cases. The lawyer’s cross-examination was limited to lab protocols
and chain-of-custody issues.32 And, neither the trial court nor the appellate court found that extremely limited effort to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Therein lies the focus of this Article. Most lawyers do not go to
law school or become lawyers because they are good at science. Most
judges do not become judges because they are good at science.33 The
suspicion is that the Strickland standard does not work as well, if at
all, when the lawyer handling a case is not technically familiar with
forensic DNA evidence and the judge evaluating whether their performance is deficient and whether that deficiency made a difference has
the same lack of familiarity, let alone understanding.
28. Shaer, supra note 22.
29. The DNA for the Defense Bar publication by the National Institute of Justice identifies
cases with a mixture of contributors as of a type “in which the need for expert assistance may be
particularly strong . . . .” NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DNA FOR THE DEFENSE BAR
19 (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/237975.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QQN-PYWH].
30. Shaer, supra note 22.
31. Otterbourg, supra note 1.
32. Id.
33. The notable exception, of course, are patent lawyers and judges on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
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This Article assesses this concern in the most empirical way possible and offers recommendations about how courts can improve the
likelihood that counsel’s conduct in cases with forensic DNA evidence
does not “so undermine the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result,”34 as it so painfully did in Mr. Sutton’s case.
I conclude that courts can apply the Strickland standard correctly
in ineffectiveness cases involving DNA only if (1) they have a basic
and current understanding of what constitutes an “objective standard
of reasonableness” against which to measure a lawyer’s conduct in a
DNA case, which is the very understanding that a Strickland “deficiency” analysis requires; and (2) they reduce their over-reliance on
the deference and the presumptions of effectiveness that incorrectly
allow them to avoid the objective-standard-of-reasonableness analysis. Finally, I propose a simple set of objective standards upon which
judges can rely. The overall effect of this effort is to better reconcile
and improve the intersection of a complex and potent scientific methodology with a judge’s task of applying a decades-old legal standard,
understanding that the judge may know little to nothing about the complex science.
Part I outlines the specific requirements of a Strickland v. Washington analysis. It includes the use of an objective standard-of-reasonableness analysis defined by reference to standards and prevailing professional norms, the strong presumption of effectiveness, and the
circumstances in which a decision not to use a line of defense constitutes ineffectiveness. Part II describes a typical DNA case, some of the
mechanisms for deconstructing the summary report the prosecution
most often provides, and some of the possible issues and defenses in
such a case. Part III examines available empirical evidence about ineffectiveness in DNA cases, including the lessons from DNA exonerations, DNA exonerations in which the exoneree initially raised an ineffectiveness claim and lost, and the fate of DNA ineffectiveness
claims in over 300 appellate cases. Part IV analyzes the empirical evidence of mistakes and success in the trial of DNA cases, including
over 45 DNA cases in which trial counsel obtained acquittals or dismissals. Part V proposes simple, minimal standards for lawyer conduct that meets an objective standard of reasonableness in a DNA case
under Strickland in accord with prevailing professional norms.
34. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
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I. STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON
The jumping-off point for any assessment of the effectiveness of
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) judges in DNA cases is Strickland v. Washington. Strickland established the two-part standard for
IAC judges to use. It also articulated the aim of the standard: (1) the
defendant must show that his lawyer’s performance was deficient; and
(2) the defendant must show the counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.35 The aim of the standard was clear: “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result.”36
In Strickland’s companion case, United States v. Cronic37, the
Court captured much of the essence of how it viewed the importance
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment:
When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted—
even if defense counsel may have made demonstrable errors—the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment
has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee
is violated. As Judge Wyzanski has written: “While a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected
to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a
sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators.”38
At first glance, the Strickland standard seems to be a way of calling counsel to task for a particularly weak performance at trial. It evaluates counsel’s conduct and potentially renders a particularly harsh
judgment about that conduct and, implicitly, counsel’s quality. A finding of ineffectiveness says that the lawyer has not even met a minimal
standard for performance at trial and that the unarmed lawyer has sacrificed their client to the gladiator. It seems, then, to operate as a means
of policing defense counsel and providing an incentive for higher quality performance at trial. It does not.39 The Strickland Court was clear
35. Id. at 687.
36. Id. at 686.
37. 446 U.S. 648 (1984).
38. Id. at 656–57 (quoting United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Sielaff v. Williams, 423 U.S. 876 (1975)).
39. At best, however, the test operates as an indirect incentive in that no direct consequences
to counsel ensue from a finding of ineffectiveness. A finding of ineffectiveness does not
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that the ineffectiveness standard exists only to protect the defendant,
not to call the lawyer directly to task or to set a number of standards
that detail the specifics of particular counsel conduct. The focus is on
ensuring the defendant’s right to a fair trial, not on disciplining their
criminal defense lawyer.
Several features of Strickland and subsequent cases, as well as the
federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) statute, embed a set of substantive and procedural mechanisms with which judges screen ineffectiveness claims. The Court’s
effort to articulate a way to measure counsel’s deficiencies, its resistance to the adoption of rigid guidelines as measuring tools, the extent of its deference to attorney decision-making, the double deference
embedded in federal habeas review of state ineffective assistance of
counsel (IAC) claims, and the general unavailability of counsel for
post-conviction IAC claims combine to erect a decisional architecture
that guides IAC judges. But, it is also a decisional architecture that is
so notably deferential that it may cause judges in DNA cases to miss
conduct by counsel that produces an unjust result.
A. How to Measure Counsel’s Deficiencies
Historically, Strickland resolved an overlap and/or a conflict in
the standards that lower courts had been using in IAC cases. Some
courts had favored reliance on specific guidelines that some courts had
been using, in particular the ABA’s Standards for the Defense Function.40 Most courts did not follow that approach.41 Rather they relied
on a totality-of-circumstances model that they believed offered more
flexibility to account for the facts in each case.42

automatically result in a finding of a violation of the rules of professional conduct. It also does not
automatically result in a finding of legal malpractice. The standards for each of those findings are
quite different, though each constitutes the direct sanctioning of an under-performing lawyer.
40. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.10(a) (4th ed. 2004). In fact, the lower court
in the Strickland case had used this approach to some extent. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d
1243, 1254 (5th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
41. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 40, § 11.10(a); see, e.g., Baldwin v. Maggio, 704 F.2d
1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The determination of whether a counsel rendered reasonably effective
assistance turns in each case on the totality of facts in the entire record. Thus, we must consider a
counsel’s performance in light of ‘the number, nature, and seriousness of the charges . . . the
strength of the prosecution’s case and the strength and complexity of the defendant’s possible defenses.’” (omission in original) (citations omitted)).
42. Some courts used a “farce and mockery” standard and others used a “reasonably competent attorney” one. While each of these standards did offer more case-specific flexibility, the vagueness of each was criticized as allowing too much subjectivity. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 40,
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Strickland adopted a different standard: objective reasonableness
in light of the prevailing professional norms in order to measure counsel’s conduct.43 The Court focused on whether the result was just, not
on the exact details of what was adequate or inadequate counsel conduct.44 The Court identified in a general way the most basic areas of
counsel performance, including duty of loyalty and a duty to avoid
conflicts of interest.45 It said that counsel functioned as assistant to the
defendant and, in that role, had an “overarching duty to advocate the
defendant’s cause . . . . Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such
skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.”46
B. Resistance to the Adoption of Specific Guidelines
“Reasonableness under prevailing norms” was as far as the Court
would go in providing any real grounding for what actually constituted
ineffectiveness.47 The Strickland Court was adamant about not adopting specific standards. It explicitly took the position that “[m]ore specific guidelines [than the two-part test were in]appropriate.”48 It did
not eschew all attention to guidelines, saying that “[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”49 But, it did not see its task as laying out
standards of performance for counsel. Rather, that task was the job of
the legal profession to maintain “standards sufficient to justify the
law’s presumption that counsel will fulfil the role in the adversary process that the [Sixth] Amendment envisions.”50 This generalized deference to the standards of the legal profession was made more difficult
to apply in actual cases by an accompanying, very specific refusal to
formally adopt specific standards of the legal profession, like the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense, but no more.51 For the
Court, rigid standards, obligations, or guidelines distracted from the

§ 11.10(a), at 635; James A. Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New
Problems, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 443, 453–54 (1977).
43. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–90 (1984).
44. Id. at 689.
45. Id. at 688–90.
46. Id. at 688 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 689.
48. Id. at 688.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 688–89.
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goal of protecting a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial and just
result under the Sixth Amendment.
Only occasionally post-Strickland has the Court explicitly looked
to specific prevailing norms. For example, the Williams-WigginsRompilla trilogy is a series of cases in the early 2000s in which the
Court made significant reference to the ABA standards regarding the
investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty
phase of a capital prosecution.52 More notably, in Padilla v. Kentucky,53 the Court confronted a defendant whose counsel failed to inform him of the collateral immigration consequences of a conviction
prior to his guilty plea.54 The Court relied upon “[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms” to make its finding that counsel “must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.”55 The Court relied on
nine different sources in discerning what the prevailing norms were,
including the ABA standards, the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association Performances Guidelines, a law review article, a Department of Justice, Office of Justice Compendium, etc.56 Nonetheless, in
all of these cases, the Court always noted such standards were only
guides and not inexorable commands.57
The Supreme Court’s willingness to use specific guidelines on
occasion does not mean that lower courts will do so. Particularly in
52. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522
(2003); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005).
53. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
54. Id. at 367.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 367–68 (“National Legal Aid and Defender Assn., Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation § 6.2 (1995); G. Herman, Plea Bargaining § 3.03, pp. 20–21 (1997);
Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell
L. Rev. 697, 713–718 (2002); A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 13:23, pp. 555, 560 (3d ed. 2004);
Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2 Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense
Systems, Standards for Attorney Performance, pp. D10, H8–H9, J8 (2000) (providing survey of
guidelines across multiple jurisdictions); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense Function 4–5.1(a), p. 197 (3d ed. 1993); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,
Pleas of Guilty 14–3.2(f), p. 116 (3d ed. 1999). ‘[A]uthorities of every stripe—including the American Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender organizations, authoritative treatises,
and state and city bar publications—universally require defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of
deportation consequences for non-citizen clients . . . .’ Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure,
and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae 12–14 (footnotes omitted) (citing, inter alia, National
Legal Aid and Defender Assn., Performance Guidelines for Criminal Prosecution, §§ 6.2–6.4
(1997); S. Bratton & E. Kelley, Practice Points: Representing a Noncitizen in a Criminal Case, 31
The Champion 61 (Jan./Feb. 2007); N. Tooby, Criminal Defense of Immigrants § 1.3 (3d ed. 2003);
2 Criminal Practice Manual §§ 45:3, 45:15 (West 2009).”).
57. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 17
(2009).
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the case of complex forensic evidence like DNA, an IAC judge unversed in the nature of forensic DNA evidence and in the methods
necessary for a defense attorney to deconstruct the seemingly overwhelming scientific evidence will need to rely on specific prevailing
norms to assess a claim of ineffectiveness. But, any existing prevailing
norms or guidelines are only as good as the judge’s decision to consult
and rely on them. The discretion built into Strickland’s approach to
guidelines means that that may not always happen. Part III will investigate whether judges actually do so in IAC DNA cases.
C. Deference to Attorney Decision-Making
Strickland says that the Sixth Amendment is not about guaranteeing perfect lawyering.58 The Court effectively tried to draw a line between mistakes and mistakes that lead to unjust results. Counsel can
make strategic and tactical mistakes without being found to be ineffective. As the Court said in Harrington v. Richter,59 “Just as there is
no expectation that competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or
tactician, an attorney may not be faulted for a reasonable miscalculation or lack of foresight or for failing to prepare for what appear to be
remote possibilities.”60 There, one of the challenges related to whether
counsel should have called experts regarding blood evidence.61 The
Court noted that any number of experts might have been valuable as
witnesses but counsel was entitled to formulate a reasonable strategy
and to balance limited resources.62 The Court frequently pointed out
that competent counsel can try a case any number of ways; that, depending on the case, a number of paths to an acquittal may exist and,
even more to the point that “there are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.”63

58. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (holds that reasonable competence rather than
perfect advocacy is all that is required under the Sixth Amendment).
59. 562 U.S. 86 (2011).
60. Id. at 110.
61. Id. at 108.
62. Id. at 107.
63. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984); see also Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct.
759, 775 (2017) (holding “Strickland’s first prong sets a high bar. A defense lawyer navigating a
criminal proceeding faces any number of choices about how best to make a client’s case. The lawyer has discharged his constitutional responsibility so long as his decisions fall within the ‘wide
range of professionally competent assistance.’ It is only when the lawyer’s errors were ‘so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment’ that
Strickland’s first prong is satisfied.” (citation omitted)).
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The Court has also added another overlapping layer of deference
best characterized as a no-backseat-driving approach. A reviewing
court must avoid the application of 20/20 hindsight, that is, the natural
tendency to look back after trial and speculate as to a possible, more
successful trial strategy.64 The court must look at counsel’s conduct in
the contemporary circumstance in which it was made.65 It must avoid
the kind of post-trial, second-guessing that comes so easily even to the
most experienced trial lawyer.66
The sum total of these overlapping layers of deference amounts
to what the Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to as the strong or
heavy presumption of effectiveness that travels with trial counsel in
every IAC claim. The Court does not want to intrude on the work of
counsel unless an error of great significance has been made. As to rigid
rules that would remove such a presumption, the Court has expressed
concern that “the existence of detailed guidelines for representation
could distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s cause.”67 And, the Court has even encouraged
IAC judges to speculate as to counsel’s choices, saying in Cullen v.
Pinholster68: “[t]he Court of Appeals was required not simply to ‘give
[the] attorneys the benefit of the doubt,’ [citation omitted], but to affirmatively entertain the range of possible ‘reasons Pinholster’s counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.’”69
As the court in Yarborough states: “[T]here is a strong presumption that [counsel took certain actions] for tactical reasons rather than
through sheer neglect.”70
D. Double Deference in Federal Habeas Review
A number of procedural factors external to the substance of a
Strickland claim also make the chances of winning an IAC claim posttrial or on appeal difficult. The confining strictures of federal habeas

64. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).
65. Maryland v. Kulbicki, 577 U.S. 1, 4 (2015).
66. Richter, 562 U.S. at 109 (2011) (“After an adverse verdict at trial even the most experienced counsel may find it difficult to resist asking whether a different strategy might have been
better, and, in the course of that reflection, to magnify their responsibility for an unfavorable outcome.”).
67. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
68. 563 U.S. 170 (2011).
69. Id. at 196 (quoting Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 692 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting)).
70. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).
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corpus review in federal court since the passage of section 2254(d) as
part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
in 1996 and the lack of a right to counsel for post-trial-collateral attacks have very much limited the number of successful IAC claims.
Statistically, the fate of habeas corpus IAC claims in federal
courts has been bleak. One study found that 81% of the habeas petitions in capital cases raised IAC claims, and 50.4% of the petitions in
non-capital cases raised ineffective assistance claims.71 Of the 2384
non-capital filings they examined, only seven habeas petitioners were
granted relief.72 Of the 267 capital cases examined between 2000 and
2002, 5% were granted based on an IAC claim; in non-capital cases,
the rate was less than 0.4%.73 Not surprisingly, pro se litigants filed
many IAC claims. The Federal Court system reported that, in 2019 in
Courts of Appeals nationwide, appeals by pro se litigants constituted
45% of all filings and, of that number, 45% were prisoner petitions.74
87% of the prisoner petitions were filed pro se.75
The AEDPA is the most significant impediment many habeas corpus petitioners face. Section 2254(d) applies to petitioners seeking habeas relief from a state court conviction.76 In particular, it imposes a
very deferential standard on a federal court’s review of a state court’s
ruling. Its language imposes several requirements for a successful habeas claim: “Clearly established federal law” must exist (as determined by the Supreme Court); the state court decision must be either
contrary to that clearly established federal law or an unreasonable application of that law; and the underlying claim must have been adjudicated on the merits in state court.77
The Supreme Court has said that Strickland and its two-part test
are clearly established federal law.78 The actual challenge for a

71. NANCY J. KING ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS 5 (Aug. 2007), https://perma.cc/AU7Z-JBQF.
72. Id. at 9.
73. Id. at 10–11.
74. U.S. Courts of Appeals—Judicial Business 2019, U.S. CTS. (2019), https://www.uscourts
.gov/statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2019 [https://perma.cc/TT3H-X4YC].
The court system does not detail how many of those prisoner petitions were habeas corpus petitions
but it is likely a large majority.
75. Id.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2018).
77. Id.
78. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (“It is past question that the rule set forth in
Strickland qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.’”).
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petitioner is to show that their case meets either the “contrary to” or
“unreasonable application standards.”79 Federal courts have recognized that this is a standard that is deferential to the state court’s ruling.80 As to the “contrary to” standard, the state court must have gotten
the clearly established law wrong.81
As to the “unreasonable application” standard, the complexity is
greater, as is the deference. It is not enough that the state court’s application of the law to the facts is one with which the reviewing federal
court disagrees. It is not enough that the state court’s finding of the
facts is one with which the reviewing federal court disagrees. It is not
enough that the reviewing court views the lower court’s application of
the law to the facts as “clear error.” The court’s application of the
clearly established law must not only be erroneous, but it must be objectively unreasonable.82
What counts as “objectively unreasonable” turns out to be a high
standard to meet. The Court in Harrington v. Richter83 was very blunt
about the height of the bar under section 2254(d):
If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was
meant to be. As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short
of imposing a complete bar on federal-court relitigation of
claims already rejected in state proceedings. [citation omitted]. It preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where
there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that
the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents. . . . As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a
federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s
ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.84
Combined with the Strickland’s deference due trial counsel, the
deference also due the state court’s ruling in an IAC case means that

79. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
80. Williams, 529 U.S. at 389.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 411; see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 40, § 28.6(f), at 1362 (“It is not enough
that a state court decision applying federal law was erroneous, ‘that application must also be unreasonable.’”).
83. 562 U.S. 86 (2011).
84. Id. at 102–03.
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winning an IAC claim via a federal habeas corpus action is very difficult. The Harrington Court made that abundantly clear when it said,
“[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly
deferential,’ [citations omitted], and when the two apply in tandem,
review is ‘doubly’ so.”85
The adjudication-on-the-merits requirement also imposes barriers
to review. First, a federal court will not entertain a habeas claim unless
the issue has been adjudicated on the merits in state court.86 If the petitioner is raising the IAC claim for the first time in the federal habeas
petition, the court will dismiss the claim.87 Second, the petitioner must
have exhausted all remedies in state court before proceeding to federal
court.88 Third, it is up to the habeas court to decide not only whether
the actual arguments or theories supported the state court’s decision
but also whether arguments or theories existed which “could have supported” the state court’s decision.89 Finally, the federal court may not
hold an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner’s IAC claim if a petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis for the claim.90 If the state
court has made factual findings relating to the claim, the habeas court
shall presume that those findings are correct, subject to the petitioner
proving them wrong by clear and convincing evidence.91
Success in federal court on an IAC habeas petition then means
overcoming a series of significant substantive and procedural hurdles.
That is both by Congress’s design of the AEDPA and by the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the combination of AEDPA and Strickland.
Those hurdles seek to balance the federal courts’ independent authority to determine what federal law is92 with a recognition that only a
few errors at the state court level are of such a magnitude that habeas
corpus functions only as a “‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the

85. Id. at 105 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2018).
87. Id. § 2254(c) (stating “[a]n applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the
law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented”).
88. Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
89. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Section 2254(e) does contain some very limited exceptions to this
rule.
91. Id. § 2254(e)(1).
92. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378–79 (2000).
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state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.”93
The stark reality is that state defendants (the huge majority of
criminal defendants in the United States94) wishing for success for
their IAC claims, must start their claim in state court and, practically
speaking, probably have a better chance of success in that court system. Many states have a state habeas corpus process and/or a process
that allows for a motion-for-new-trial or other-post-conviction-relief
process.95 Depending on the jurisdiction, the direct-appeal process
may allow for an IAC claim to be litigated. As section 2254(c) notes,
one must raise an IAC claim in some fashion at the state level and have
the court address its merits in what is effectively a prerequisite to a
federal habeas petition.96
E. Lack of Access to Counsel
Whether in state or federal court, the availability of counsel is
important. The numerous and complex procedural and substantive requirements of establishing a valid IAC claim are likely challenging for
most counsel and much more so for a pro se defendant/petitioner.
Many prisoner petitioners are, in fact, pro se.97 In federal court, they
do not have a right to counsel for a collateral attack on a federal conviction.98 And, they do not have a right to counsel for a habeas attack
on a state conviction.99 The same is true in most state court systems.100
Though some may have counsel by virtue of a non-profit advocacy
organization like the National Innocence Project or other organization
in its national network, the majority do not have counsel and must
navigate the substantive and procedural hurdles described above themselves, without any training.
*************************

93. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102–03 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
94. Anisha Singh & Billy Corriher, State or Federal Court?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/2016/08/08/142438/fact-s
heet-state-or-federal-court/ [https://perma.cc/EZM6-7PFF] (over 90 percent of cases are heard in
state courts).
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
96. Id. § 2254(c).
97. U.S. Court of Appeals—Judicial Business 2019, supra note 74.
98. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).
99. Id.
100. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1989).
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Conceptually then, Strickland, its progeny and the AEDPA create
a decisional architecture for judges through substance and procedure
that has a good bit of flexibility for judicial discretion in the joints. Its
two-part test suggests that guidelines may be of value and shies away
from specific standards. Its design is to protect defendants from unjust
results, and it strongly presumes that their lawyer acted within the
bounds of effectiveness.101 Short of an evidentiary hearing to the contrary, the deference embedded in the presumption includes the court’s
ability to speculate whether counsel “could” have had strategic reasons for their conduct.
The goal is to respect the outcomes of a state criminal justice process short of an “extreme malfunction” through an application of layered deference and presumption.102 This decisional architecture has
evolved in response to court decisions—Strickland and its progeny—
and statutory change—primarily the AEDPA. The impetus for this
evolution has been as much about broad deferential process concerns
as it has been about ensuring that the outcomes in criminal cases are
just or, at least, about reducing the number of unjust outcomes. Respect for the autonomy of a lawyer to try the case the way they decide
and respect for the autonomy of a state court to make its own decisions
both make sense conceptually.
The deeper question is whether this balancing of conceptual concerns as to IAC claims actually works well in practice. Too much deference and too many procedural hurdles in service to attorney and
court autonomy may lead to an entrenched system that results in missing too many unjust outcomes. Yet, too much of a focus on just outcomes in every single case may lead to a system in which attorneys
take a defensive posture in trying a case in a way that is too attentive
to making mistakes and a court system burdened by endless IAC
claims that seem to merit attention.
The remainder of this Article will examine the effectiveness of
this decisional architecture as it has been operating with regard to a
particular kind of challenging case—IAC claims in cases involving
forensic DNA evidence. IAC DNA cases are challenging primarily
because of the complexity of the DNA evidence. Such cases involve
molecular biology, population genetics, and biostatistics. It involves
not easily understood forensic science, and the science is prone to
101. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
102. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011).
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misunderstanding by jurors. Perhaps more concerning, most lawyers
and judges do not understand it as, with exceptions, they did not go to
law school because they were particularly good at understanding complex science.
These dynamics create a risk that the well-intentioned decisional
architecture for assessing IAC claims may well be ill-equipped, at the
least, to sort out which are the IAC DNA claims with merit or without
merit. To put it perhaps a bit too simply, if a court has no understanding of DNA evidence, they will perhaps be too prone to say some nuanced version of, “well, it’s compelling evidence” and defer to the decisions of the trial lawyer who themselves had little understanding of
how to approach let alone strategize well as to DNA evidence.
That concern with judicial lack of understanding is exacerbated
by that which is very important but unstated in Strickland: the misfocus on a search for innocent defendants rather than not-guilty defendants. The search in IAC claims is for assurance that a contest has
occurred; that the defense lawyer has engaged enough in attacking the
prosecution’s case; that the trial was not akin to the sacrifice of an
unarmed prisoner to a gladiator. Strickland, however, does not say that
an IAC court need not worry about the outcome as long as it is evident
that the defendant is not innocent. It does not say that for a reason: the
goal of the defense lawyer is only to raise at least one reasonable
doubt. It is not to prove the client’s innocence, which is constitutionally presumed. A court is looking in the wrong place if it is looking
for the kind of deficient performance by counsel that would mean an
innocent person was convicted. A court must look for the kind of deficient performance by counsel that means they overlooked a possible
reasonable doubt. The second is a notably less onerous burden than
the first for defense counsel. It also increases the number and types of
errors that might constitute ineffectiveness.
Part II turns to a brief introduction of the science behind the
opaque report of DNA results defense counsel first receives. Parts III
& IV turn to a variety of empirical evidence to take some measure of
how well the decisional architecture for IAC claims works when used
to evaluate IAC DNA claims. These sections will look at over 450 IAC
DNA cases, DNA exonerations, and the success of trial lawyers in
challenging DNA before a jury and examples of cases in which a defendant claimed IAC based on how his lawyer handled the DNA evidence; lost the IAC DNA claim and was later exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing.
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II. THE TYPICAL DNA CASE
This part describes a measure of the sophistication and complexity of the knowledge and understanding that is necessary to evaluate
and potentially litigate a DNA case. DNA evidence is not just another
type of forensic evidence like fingerprinting or blood grouping. To
appreciate the significance of the empirical evidence in Parts III and
IV and the standards described in Part V, it is important to understand
the basics of the typical DNA case from the defense perspective.103
A defense lawyer most often first becomes aware that they have
a DNA case when they receive the first packet of discovery from the
prosecution.104 Commonly, what they will see is a summary report of
the DNA testing results. It usually is 1–4 pages and identifies, at a
general level, what items were tested, and what known genetic profiles
matched the genetic profiles in the crime scene sample of unknown
origin. The report also describes what the statistical significance of
any match is. It may be in the form of a population frequency estimate,
a Combined Probability of Inclusion (CPI), or the product of probabilistic genotyping.105
A. The Summary Report
The summary report is the product of a four-step process.106 In
the first stage, the police or lab technicians collect the crime scene
sample and, either then or more often later, collect known samples
from the alleged victim, if any, and from potential suspect(s) and
transport them to the forensic lab.
103. What follows is neither an exhaustive treatment of the breadth or depth which might pass
as a typical case.
104. Throughout this section, I will describe what commonly occurs in DNA cases with the
understanding that the procedural and substantive variations in the country’s 50+ criminal justice
systems are numerous. The focus is on what a defense lawyer does in “deconstructing” a DNA case
and reconstructing it into a viable theory of the case accounting for the DNA evidence, assuming a
viable theory of the case exists.
105. “Population frequency estimate” captures the chance that someone else in the general population, unrelated to the suspect, has a genetic profile matching that of the crime-scene sample.
“Combined Probability of Inclusion” (CPI), has been used often when one cannot distinguish between genetic profiles within a mixture. It tries to capture the probability of someone chosen at
random in the population not being excluded as a contributor to the DNA mixture. “Probabilistic
genotyping” uses statistical methods and algorithms via relatively new software to try to sort out
mixtures.
106. Much of what is generally described in this section comes from my extensive personal
experience litigating forensic DNA cases, attending innumerable training sessions, and reading extensive volumes of admissibility hearings and trial transcripts in other lawyers’ DNA cases. I have
also relied on an NIJ publication entitled DNA For The Defense Bar, supra note 29.
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In stage two, the forensic lab engages in a preliminary analysis to
determine what is present in the sample—sperm, skin cells, etc.—and,
a bit simply, then transforms the crime scene sample and the known
samples into a form by which the genetic profiles generated can be
analyzed for comparison to each other.
In stage three, the analyst compares the genetic profile of the
crime scene sample to the available known samples, both visually and
by computer. During the comparison process, the analyst knows which
samples are crime scene samples and which are the known samples
and to whom each belongs. The analyst then declares a match, a nonmatch, or an inconclusive result. The match is best understood as a
non-exclusion–the analyst cannot exclude the known sample’s origin
as being in the pool of people matching the genetic profile of the crime
scene sample. If the crime scene sample involves a mixture of more
than two people’s DNA, then sorting out whose types (alleles) are present at each genetic location becomes more complicated.
In stage four, if they have declared a match, the analyst lends
meaning to the significance of the declaration of a match or non-exclusion by developing a Population Frequency Estimate (PFE) that essentially characterizes the chances that the match is a coincidence. If
the crime scene sample contains a mixture, the calculation of the PFE
becomes more complicated and laboratories may use a CPI or probabilistic genotyping software.
Forensic DNA testing thus is a measuring system, a fancy one
based on molecular biology, population genetics, and biostatistics, but
nonetheless, a measuring system. An evidentiary sample is turned into
a measurable form; the molecular biological ruler is “held up” to the
sample and it is measured; and then the measurements are compared
and lent meaning. Simple and complicated.
B. Deconstructing the Summary Report
A defense lawyer in a DNA case, in the first instance, sees only
the final product—the summary report, usually about 1–4 pages long.
It is their job to deconstruct the report to see how reliable the methodology used was; how reliably the analysis was done; how accurate the
results were; and strategically, what is the best theory of the case that
embraces that investigation.
On its face, the report is opaque as to possible challenges to the
evidence. It may suggest that the crime scene sample involved a mixture of more than one or two individuals’ DNA but will offer no
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description as to how that mixture was interpreted or quantified. Other
than that, the summary report reveals little of value to a lawyer seeking
to mount a defense to seemingly overwhelming forensic evidence.
Broadly, a defense lawyer must engage in a two-step process to
develop an effective theory of the case: (1) deconstructing the summary report in order to understand the DNA evidence to make informed strategic decisions about how to proceed in the case; and (2)
implementing those decisions to maximize the opportunities presented, if any.
Complete discovery is the foundation for deconstructing a summary report. A lawyer cannot understand the significance of the DNA
evidence otherwise.107 The complete laboratory case file documents
everything that occurs in the laboratory from the time the samples arrive until the results are produced and contains a wealth of other important information.108 An evaluation of the scene-to-laboratory and
the in-laboratory information is the only way a defense lawyer can
begin to make informed decisions about how to proceed.
For a minimally effective discovery request, a defense lawyer will
need to have at least some understanding of the relevant terms if they
are requesting discovery and particularly if the discovery request is
contested. Therein lies the need to consult, at least in a preliminary
fashion, with an expert of some sort. That expert may be another lawyer or a forensic unit in the office with sufficient experience in DNA
litigation to read the case files in a way that may bring to the fore possible issues in the scene-to-lab reports and the in-lab reports. Or, the
lawyer may hire an expert to do a preliminary review of the files for
the same purpose.109 Or, the lawyer may educate themselves by reading transcripts of admissibility hearings and trails, attending training
seminars,110 by reading texts that specialize in forensic DNA

107. Id. at 21–31.
108. Id. at 24–30 (describing in detail the information a defense lawyer wants from the prosecution in a discovery request to lay the foundation for analyzing litigation choices).
109. See, e.g., FORENSIC BIOINFORMATICS, http://www.bioforensics.com/ [https://perma.cc/
BZ3E-QXFZ] (explaining how the company “reviews cases involving forensic DNA testing . . .
[by] employ[ing] an automated analysis system to provide an objective review while making the
results easy to understand”).
110. DNA CLE Courses, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., https://nacdl.inreachce.com/Sear
chResults?searchType=1&category=fddb39d3-01ac-4689-97e6-d9f57f641f4c&sortBy=recentlya
dded [https://perma.cc/5WU8-WNWD] (the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL) has over 20 CLE training videos regarding forensic DNA evidence in its CLE store).
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evidence111 and talking informally with scientists and experienced
DNA lawyers.
Once a lawyer has deconstructed the case files and made an informed, preliminary set of judgement about the possibilities, they will
either develop a theory of the case that assumes the technical accuracy
of the DNA evidence or a theory of the case that seeks to undermine
its technical accuracy. The second approach will likely require the retention of an expert for trial preparation (particularly, cross-examination of the prosecution’s experts) and often testimony at trial. It is also
possible that even if the lawyer assumes that the DNA evidence is
technically accurate after such review, they will still require the retention of an expert, particularly when the approach is a transfer defense.
C. Implementing the Strategy
Retention of an expert enables a lawyer to understand how to: (1)
evaluate the DNA case well; (2) decide whether to ask for additional
testing; (3) decide whether to mount an admissibility challenge; (4)
prepare for cross-examination of the prosecution’s expert; and (5) present expert testimony of one’s own at trial. Each of these steps is on
the table for consideration as counsel evaluates the case, though one
may decide not to pursue all of them depending on the specifics of the
case.
1. Deciding Whether to Ask for Additional Testing
The decision to ask for additional testing in a case is not simple.
It involves assessing whether the facts of the case give rise to a possible reason for such testing and whether any testable sample remains.
It involves litigating access to and funds for additional testing. It involves significant and often difficult conversations with one’s client
about the possible risks of getting additional testing. It involves

111. See, e.g., JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING (2010); JOHN
M. BUTLER, ADVANCED TOPICS IN FORENSIC DNA TYPING: INTERPRETATION (2014); PETER
GILL, MISLEADING DNA EVIDENCE: REASONS FOR MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (2014); Jason B.
Sheffield, Winning Despite DNA: The Truth You Must Reveal, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 2020, at 18
https://justiceingeorgia.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/p18-26-33_Sheffield_DNA_April_2020
_Champion_web-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/T76R-DJXJ]. For an extensive library of information on
potential problems with DNA testing issues as well as a software program that helps one analyze
the results in a particular case, see Possible Issues with DNA Evidence, FORENSIC
BIOINFORMATICS, http://www.bioforensics.com/dna-testing-issues/ [https://perma.cc/FV38APYD]; GenoStat, FORENSIC BIOINFORMATICS, http://www.bioforensics.com/genostat/
[https://perma.cc/64BC-WGPT].
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assessing whether the prosecution will have access to the testing results in one’s jurisdiction. And, it involves assessing whether in one’s
jurisdiction, if the prosecution does not have access to the results and
they are incriminating, the prosecution can submit into evidence that
the defense accessed the crime-scene sample and argue that the fact
them not producing results suggests a bad result for the defendant.
Sometimes, the ensuing decisions make themselves and sometimes
they involve multi-layered risk assessments by well-informed counsel.
2. Deciding Whether to Mount an Admissibility Challenge
The decision to mount a challenge to the admissibility of the prosecution’s forensic DNA evidence is very jurisdiction-specific. Within
a particular jurisdiction, it may be that challenges to the molecular biological methodology (that encompassing stages three and four above)
used by the testing laboratory in the case has passed a Daubert or Frye
challenge.112 Or, it may be that the methodology for interpreting mixtures raises questions about its reliability.113 It may be that the stagefour quantification of the non-exclusion represents a new approach to
that stage that raises an unresolved Daubert or Frye issue.114
Even if none of those issues come to the fore as a part of the lawyer’s case-specific assessment, the case may raise an “application” issue in which the analyst in the case misapplied the approved methodology. Federally and in jurisdictions that have adopted a state version
of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, application challenges are now admissibility challenges.115 Litigation that might follow a decision to litigate admissibility is very expert-dependent.116

112. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
113. See discussion infra Section I.D.
114. See discussion infra Section I.D.
115. See FED. R. EVID. 702(d) (“[T]he expert has reliably applied the principles and methods
to the facts of the case.”).
In many jurisdictions prior to Daubert, application challenges did not constitute grounds
for an admissibility challenge. See, e.g., State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 492–93 (N.H. 1992)
(rejecting an application challenge as part of a Frye challenge). And, Daubert itself said that a
Daubert analysis did not encompass a challenge to the accuracy of the results. Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 589–91.
Some jurisdictions, like California with its Kelly/Frye test, encompass certain kinds of
application challenges as admissibility challenges. See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244–45
(Cal. 1976).
116. See Anjelica Cappellino, Daubert vs. Frye: Navigating the Standards of Admissibility for
Expert Testimony, EXPERT INST. (SEPT. 7, 2021), https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/in
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3. Preparation for Cross-Examination of Prosecution’s Expert(s)
Preparation for cross-examining the prosecution’s DNA expert
involves a set of joint decisions by counsel and the defense expert.117
Again, such decisions are very case-specific but, currently, most often
fall either under a case-related application issue or under some of the
issues raised in Section II.D. The interrelationship between the expert’s assessment and advice about the potentially important topics for
cross-examination and the lawyer’s level of command and confidence
in their ability to develop those issues on cross-examination is profound.118 It involves difficult decisions about which areas to pursue
and which areas to forego based on, in the end, the lawyer’s understanding and knowledge of the issues to be raised.
4. Presenting One’s Own Expert Testimony
The issues present when counsel is presenting their own expert
are similar to those present when preparing for cross-examination. Decision-making about what to cover on direct examination and how to
cover it involve a dynamic process between the expert and the lawyer.119 Not infrequently, an expert may have a clear set of scientific
topics in mind.120 Some of those topics may not, however, be of a kind
that the lawyer would judge as ones that can be clearly and simply
presented to the jury, be it because of the technical complexity of the
issue or because of their relative lack of persuasive power.121 In this
dynamic decision-making process, a lawyer is often acting as something of a translator for the expert. They are assessing, with an eye
towards a lay juror, which issues will “take” in front of the jury and
which won’t. And, translators of any kind must know both languages
well—here, forensic DNA science and jury language—in order to accomplish the goal of presenting persuasive expert testimony during
direct examination.
*******************************

sights/daubert-vs-frye-navigating-the-standards-of-admissibility-for-expert-testimony/ [https://per
ma.cc/6E4N-JG9K].
117. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LAW 101: LEGAL GUIDE FOR THE FORENSIC
EXPERT 35 (Sept. 8, 2011), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/252494.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN7L76H2].
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 21.
121. See id.
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The import of the above review is clear. A lawyer handling a
DNA case cannot engage in constitutionally adequate representation
without a foundation of understanding, knowledge, and/or experience
to make informed decisions, whatever the decision may be. However,
lawyers cannot make such decisions without an informed review of
the entire case file. It is unlikely they can make such decisions without
the assistance of some sort of expert advice The number of substantive
approaches an attorney can take in litigating a DNA case are several.
Any of them requires a foundation of understanding, knowledge,
and/or experience to implement.122 The following section presents a
selection of some of the current issues in current DNA litigation.
D. Some Current Issues in DNA Litigation
The goal for a criminal defense lawyer when assessing substantive approaches to attacking the prosecution’s DNA evidence is on
generating a defense that raises a reasonable doubt.123 It is not about
finding a way to establish the defendant’s actual innocence.124 That
distinction is important in the consideration of an after-the-fact ineffective assistance of counsel claim. An effective DNA defense lawyer
wins the case. They do not necessarily establish actual innocence and
do not need to do so, though it sometimes may be the case.
Some of the current trends in successful defense litigation of
DNA cases focus on: (1) complex mixtures; (2) laboratory performance; (3) probabilistic genotyping; and (4) transfer.
1. Complex Mixtures
A complex mixture is a mixture of more than two people’s DNA
profiles.125 In Josiah Sutton’s case, the crime scene sample was a mixture of three people.126 Commonly, such a mixture is reported in a
summary report. A laboratory uses a different method for calculating

122. Cappellino, supra note 116.
123. See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/beyond_a_reasonable_doubt [https://perma.cc/K9YG-4PEC].
124. See id.
125. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON METHODS 8 (2016) [hereinafter PCAST], https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma
.cc/BP2K-BEVZ].
126. Josiah Sutton, supra note 3.
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the population frequency estimate of a mixture.127 A laboratory sees
complex mixtures in crime-scene samples when the sample is drawn
from a location in which more than two people may have had access—
clothing, steering wheels, blood stains, etc.128 Importantly, a laboratory cannot determine which of the profiles was there first or more
recently.129
A complex mixture is much more difficult to interpret than a simple one (one with no more than two profiles).130 It presents several
problems, particularly when small amounts of DNA are present because several DNA profiles are superimposed in the sample.131 A publication by President’s Counsel of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) has highlighted many of these problems, concluding
that “[i]t is often impossible to tell with certainty which alleles are
present in the mixture or how many separate individuals contributed
to the mixture, let alone accurately to infer the DNA profile of each
individual.”132
The PCAST report highlights at some length the problems laboratories have had quantifying the meaning of what is observed in a mixture.133 It rejects the use of the previously commonly used statistical
method of quantification—the Combined Probability of Inclusion
(CPI).134 It raises concerns about the next generation of statistical
methods for interpreting mixture using probabilistic genotyping software, calling for more empirical evidence of foundational validity.135
PCAST’s research documents a number of examples of problems in
real cases.136
Complex mixture cases are winnable. In a remarkable 2017 case
from a collection of DNA cases in which defense counsel achieved a

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

PCAST, supra note 125, at 75–80.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 76; accord John M. Butler, The Future of Forensic DNA Analysis, 370 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B, Aug. 5, 2015, at 1, 6; John S. Buckleton et al., Towards Understanding the Effect of Uncertainty in the Number of Contributors to DNA Stains, 1 FORENSIC SCI.
INT’L: GENETICS 20, 20 (2007).
133. PCAST, supra note 125, at 75.
134. Id. at 82.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 76–77; see also Itiel E. Dror & Greg Hampikian, Subjectivity and Bias in Forensic
DNA Mixture Interpretation, 51 SCI. & JUST. 204, 204–08 (2011) (discussing the mixed DNA analysis from a real sexual assault case in Georgia).
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dismissal or acquittal (hereinafter, DNA-Wins Collection),137 the
DNA evidence from the clothing of the victim of an attempted rape
presented as a simple mixture—the victim and the defendant with a 1
in 211,000 chance of a coincidental match.138 The sample involved
small amounts of DNA (known as, low-copy number DNA).139 Retesting by the defense revealed that the DNA profile in the mixture
originally identified as consistent with the defendant’s turned out to
be a complex mixture of three men, none of whom were the defendant.140
2. Laboratory Performance
In the context of forensic DNA evidence in criminal cases, even
one mistake can have disastrous consequences—the conviction of an
innocent person.141 And, laboratory mistakes happen.142
The National Institute of Standards and Technology conducted a
scientific study in which they sent the same mixture sample to 105
laboratories in the U.S. and three in Canada along with samples from
three suspects.143 Most of the laboratories correctly identified two of
the suspects as being in the sample.144 Seventy-four laboratories incorrectly identified the third suspect as being in the mixture when he
was not.145
Sometimes, the mistakes arise out of the actions of a bad analyst
as in Josiah Sutton’s case where the analyst who analyzed the samples

137. Unpublished Questionnaire from Samuel Leonard, Deputy Pub. Def. IV, L.A. Cnty. Pub.
Def., to author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #55]. The author collected 59
DNA cases from around the country in which either a pre-trial dismissal or trial acquittal occurred.
See Section IV.C for more detailed findings about the DNA-Wins Collection.
138. Id.; Charlotte Word, What Is LCN?—Definitions and Challenges, PROMEGA (2010),
https://www.promega.com/resources/profiles-in-dna/2010/what-is-lcn-definitions-and-challenges/
[https://perma.cc/VTN9-HVVS].
139. Word, supra note 138.
140. Chad Sokol, Flawed DNA Test Nearly Pinned Spokane Man for Attempted Rape in Beverly
Hills, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/apr/22/flawed
-dna-test-nearly-pinned-spokane-man-for-atte/ [https://perma.cc/5LB9-5FYJ]. The DNA-Wins
Collection contains 4 other cases that also involved mixtures.
141. See, e.g., Katie Worth, Framed for Murder by His Own DNA, PBS: FRONTLINE (Apr. 19,
2018), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/framed-for-murder-by-his-own-dna/ [https://pe
rma.cc/C74R-7HV8].
142. See Shaer, supra note 22.
143. John M. Butler et al., NIST Interlaboratory Studies Involving DNA Mixtures (MIX05 and
MIX13): Variation Observed and Lessons Learned, 37 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 81, 81–94
(2018).
144. Id. at 89–90.
145. Id. at 90.
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in the case got it wrong.146 A 2004 Chicago Tribune analysis of two
hundred DNA and death row exoneration cases “found that more than
a quarter involved faulty crime lab work or testimony.”147 Sometimes,
a lab analyst may be engaged in fraud.148 Only consultation with experts, follow-up investigation, and access to case files uncovered these
problems.
3. Probabilistic Genotyping
Forensic scientists have struggled with quantifying what is occurring in a mixture.149 The PCAST report found that CPI-based methodologies were not foundationally valid.150 Some laboratories have begun to use probabilistic genotyping software, a technique, though
potentially promising, that is subject to significant concerns in the scientific community,151 as well as significant litigation.152 The PCAST
report found that more foundation validation still needed to be done in
some uses of probabilistic genotyping software.153
4. Transfer Issues
A transfer defense has become an increasingly effective defense
in recent years.154 For example, if the police collect the defendant’s
clothes and put them in the same bag as the victim’s clothes, it is very
possible that the victim’s DNA will appear on the defendant’s
146. Josiah Sutton, supra note 3.
147. Maurice Possley et al., Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs, CHI. TRIBUNE (Oct. 21, 2004,
2:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/chi-041021forensics-story.html [https
://perma.cc/VM3L-XWHJ].
148. Laura Cadiz, Md.-Based DNA Lab Fires Analyst Over Falsified Tests, BALT. SUN
(Nov. 18, 2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20211015212959/https://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/bs-xpm-2004-11-18-0411180133-story.html.
149. PCAST, supra note 125, at 75.
150. Id. at 82.
151. Mark W. Perlin et al., TrueAlleleÒ Genotype Identification on DNA Mixtures Containing
Up to Five Unknown Contributors, 60 J. FORENSIC SCIS. 857, 857 (2015); Susan A. Greenspoon et
al., Establishing the Limits of TrueAlleleÒ Casework: A Validation Study, 60 J. FORENSIC SCIS.
1263 (2015); Jo-Anne Bright et al., Developmental Validation of STRmix™, Expert Software for
the Interpretation of Forensic DNA Profiles, 23 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 226 (2016).
152. See People v. Wakefield, 9 N.Y.S.3d 540, 540–43 (Sup. Ct. 2015); People v. BullardDaniel, 42 N.Y.S.3d 714, 715 (Cnty. Ct. 2016); see also People v. Rodriguez, No. 5471/2009 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 1, 2012) (considering a defendant’s argument that probabilistic genotyping DNA
evidence offered by the prosecution should be inadmissible). See generally Bess Stiffelman, No
Longer the Gold Standard: Probabilistic Genotyping Is Changing the Nature of DNA Evidence in
Criminal Trials, 24 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 110, 111–18 (2019) (explaining the complexities and
difficulties with the new probabilistic genotyping software used for DNA analyses).
153. PCAST, supra note 125, at 81–82.
154. Stiffelman, supra note 152, at 115–16.
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clothing.155 The summary report will not reveal when or how the victim’s DNA got on the defendant’s clothing.156 Transfer can occur in a
large number of circumstances and scientists have documented direct
and indirect transfer possibilities since at least 1997.157 One review
cataloged a series of studies in which DNA was collected from such
touched items as tools, clothing, knives, vehicles, steering wheels,
firearms, food, bedding, condoms, lip cosmetics, wallets, jewelry,
glass, skin, fingerprints, paper, cables, windows, doors, and stones as
well as transfers within DNA laboratories.158
The DNA-Win Collection provides several examples of cases in
which a transfer defense was successful.159 In one California case, the
defendant was acquitted using a transfer defense accompanied by expert testimony.160 In a 2012 New Hampshire case, the defendant was
acquitted of an aggravated felonious sexual assault based on a transfer
defense.161 The DNA-Win collection had a total of sixteen acquittals
155. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., supra note 29, at 62.
156. Id.
157. Cynthia M. Cale et al., Could Secondary DNA Transfer Falsely Place Someone at the
Scene of a Crime?, 61 J. FORENSIC SCIS. 196, 196 (2016). A subsequent study found secondary
transfers occurred even when the handshakes were reduced to 60, 30, and 10 seconds. DNA Can
Be Transferred to Objects via Handshakes, at Random, BUTING, WILLIAMS & STILLING, S.C.
(Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.buting.com/blog/2019/03/dna-can-be-transferred-to-objects-via-han
dshakes-at-random/ [https://perma.cc/LU56-NFHG].
158. Roland AH van Oorschot et al., Forensic Trace DNA: A Review, 1 INVESTIGATIVE
GENETICS (2010), https://investigativegenetics.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/2041-22231-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC2E-GDPH]; see also A. A. Oleiwi et al., The Relative DNA-Shedding
Propensity of the Palm and Finger Surfaces, 55 SCI. & JUST. 329, 332 (2015) (analyzing the quantity of DNA recoverable from palmar surfaces and fingertips); Federica Alessandrini et al., Fingerprints as Evidence for a Genetic Profile: Morphological Study on Fingerprints and Analysis of
Exogenous and Individual Factors Affecting DNA Typing, 48 J. FORENSIC SCIS. 586, 592 (2003)
(analyzing individual factors affecting DNA typing); T. Boyko et al., DNA Within Cars: Prevalence
of DNA from Driver, Passenger and Others on Steering Wheels, 51 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCIS. S91,
S93 (2019) (analyzing DNA from within cars).
159. Unpublished survey questionnaires from defense attorneys, to author, and survey of news
data, by author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Collection]. The sample was derived
from contact with some public defender programs around the country; with private criminal defense
lawyers whom the author knew tried cases involving DNA evidence; through news reports about
acquittals in DNA cases; through requests on listservs; and through the author’s own experience
trying DNA cases. The sample by no means comprises an exhaustive list of all the “victories” in
cases in which DNA evidence was presented as the total number of attorneys providing data was
less than 40.
160. Unpublished Questionnaire from Thomas J. Burns Jr., Att’y, L.A. Cnty. Alternate Pub.
Def., to author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #35].
161. Unpublished Questionnaire from Eleftheria Keans, Staff Att’y, N.H. Pub. Def., and
Amanda Steenhuis, Managing Att’y, N.H. Pub. Def., to author (on file with author) [hereinafter
DNA-Win Case #31]. One of the defense attorneys reported that the “[v]ictim’s DNA was on our
client’s penis . . . . [V]ictim’s vagina had only her [boyfriend’s] DNA, not our client’s. And based
on when she said she had sex with [her boyfriend] and was assaulted . . . [boyfriend’s] DNA should
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or dismissals in which a transfer defense was used in whole or in
part.162
*************************
None of the issues identified here are apparent in the short summary report defense counsel receives.163 That report is, effectively,
opaque. Counsel can dissolve the opacity only with “extra” work,
work beyond what counsel would routinely do in a fingerprinting or a
blood grouping case.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel
in criminal cases, not perfect representation nor representation that establishes factual innocence.164 The goal of that work is to show the
jury that the case is not provable beyond a reasonable doubt; that a
reasonable doubt exists. The goal is a manageable one with
knowledge, training, and access to experience to raise the above and
other issues.
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF JUDICIAL INEFFECTIVENESS IN IAC
DNA CASES
Empirical evidence from reported appellate IAC DNA cases is
one way to measure how well the decisional architecture for IAC
claims works. It suggests that the decisional architecture described in
Part I is not striking the intended balance between deference and just
results in IAC DNA cases. Courts are, more often than not, analyzing
the claims superficially. Sometimes, they do not engage in the analytical work that Strickland and its progeny call for.165 Sometimes, they
over-rely, and too superficially, on the deference built into the Strickland standard or the double-deference embodied in the EDPA.166
A. IAC DNA Cases
A sampling of 317 IAC DNA cases at a forest level gives us an
outline of the kinds and quality of cases and approaches IAC DNA
courts have taken.167 Before a closer, more substantive examination of
have been on client’s penis along with her DNA. We argued DNA transfer (via hand) as [to] how
her DNA was on client’s penis.” Id.
162. DNA-Win Collection, supra note 159.
163. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., supra note 29, at 28.
164. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984).
165. Id. at 687.
166. Id.
167. The sampling is not, statistically, a random sample. I started with a collection of 500 cases
pulled from Westlaw with a search of the term “DNA & ineffective assistance of counsel,” which

(10) 55.2_SCHERR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

560

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

5/5/22 2:06 PM

[Vol. 55:527

denials and grants of petitions/motions, it’s important to get a look at
the forest of case data more generally.
In the first instance, eighteen of those cases involved procedural
dismissals that did not reach the merits.168 Issues that lead to procedural dismissal included a lack of timely filing,169 unauthorized subsequent post-conviction relief (PCR) petitions,170 deferral pending filing of another collateral claim,171 and a lack of jurisdiction.172
Of the remaining 299 cases, the most common procedural mechanisms bringing the IAC DNA case in front of the court were state/federal habeas corpus petitions (46.5%),173 direct appeals (28.8%), and
either post-conviction relief motions or a motions for new trial
(25.4%). In 4.3% of the cases, the petitioner/defendant was litigating
a motion to withdraw their appeal based on IAC. Substantively, petitioners/defendants did not fare well in their IAC DNA claims. Far
more were denied than granted: 93% denied, 4.7% granted, and 2.3%
were remanded in some fashion for an evidentiary hearing on the IAC
claim. No comparative data about analogous non-DNA IAC claims is
available to place this in context. Though this seems like an extraordinarily infrequent number of successful IAC DNA claims, it is also not
surprising, given the number of substantive and procedural hurdles in
place for IAC claims.
produced over 3,000 cases. I examined 500 of those cases, of which 317 were cases that involved
IAC & DNA, rather than requests for post-conviction DNA testing or other non-IAC DNA issues.
In acknowledgement of the lack of statistical randomness of the sampling (which itself depends on
an unavailable Westlaw algorithm), I have not drawn any conclusions in this section based on the
sample being representative of what apparently is 2,500–3,000 reported IAC DNA cases.
To add a bit more shape to the dimensions of the forest being analyzed, the cases span
approximately 30 years and portions of four decades, 1990–2020. Of the cases, 34.7% were federal
district court cases; 3.5% were federal circuit court of appeals cases; and 56.2% were state court
cases. Geographically, the cases originate in 44 different states. Of the federal cases, 43 different
federal district courts had DNA IAC cases and seven different circuit courts of appeal.
168. See, e.g., Ryals v. Abrams, No. 11-CV-95-KS, 2011 WL 3876992, at *5 (S.D. Miss.
Aug. 16, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 11-CV-95-KS, 2011 WL 3876940 (S.D.
Miss. Aug. 31, 2011); Meyers v. Tibbels, No. 13CV02170, 2015 WL 1980631, at *1 (N.D. Ohio
Apr. 30, 2015); Commonwealth v. Quiero, No. 2039 MDA 2014, 2015 WL 6689511, at *3 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2015).
169. Ryals, 2011 WL 3876992, at *5.
170. State v. Frazier, 2013 WL 3339406, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct., June 19, 2013).
171. State v. Brown, 135 So. 3d 718, 723–24 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (deferring a claim until a
post-conviction relief is filed); Quiero, 2015 WL 6689511, at *3 (filing a collateral appeal rather
than direct appeal is appropriate).
172. Fletcher v. Outlaw, No. 06cv646, 2008 WL 2625662, at *3–4 (E.D. Tex. June 30, 2008)
(overruling petitioner’s objections due to the lack of jurisdiction to review a ruling by Court of
Criminal Appeals for the Armed Forces or Court of Appeals for the Air Force).
173. Of the claims, 84.9% were federal habeas claims and 15.1% were state habeas claims. By
far, state claims tended to be direct appeal, and post-conviction relief/motion-for-new-trial claims.
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There are five trends discernable from drilling down on the analyses of individual cases: (A) no court ever explicitly engaged in determining what the “prevailing professional norms” were in the jurisdiction as it related to effective assistance of counsel in a case with
forensic DNA evidence; (B) courts frequently relied on the deference
standard of Strickland and the double deference standard of the
AEDPA and did so with little explicit and detailed analysis of the circumstances of the case; (C) a failure to follow Strickland’s command
to forego deference when analyzing whether counsel had a basis for
doing no or little investigation of the prosecution’s DNA evidence before opting for another defense; (D) a consistent absence of reliance
of useful, analogous non-DNA IAC case law relating to a failure to
request testing and a failure to hire, consult or call an expert to testify;
and (E) representation by counsel matters as to the outcome. The result
is a strong impression that courts considering IAC DNA cases do so
in a seeming analytical vacuum except when relying on the deference
and double-deference doctrines. Thus, those doctrines take on the almost explicit shape of easy escape hatches that avoid any effort to
weigh the balance between appropriate deference and unjust results.
1. Prevailing Professional Norms
Recall that Strickland did not want to set specific standards as to
that which constitutes effective assistance. It disliked the rigidity of
that approach and preferred guidelines that acknowledged the wide
range of professionally competent assistance. It wanted to identify
only the kind of attorney conduct that fell outside that wide range. The
best way to do so, it said, was to measure that conduct against the more
flexible prevailing-professional-norms standard. Only then would a
court be able to determine well which conduct constituted ineffective
assistance.
In the sampling of cases, very few cases even referred to the concept of professional norms. When they did so it was most often
obliquely. In State v. Swan,174 the defendant claimed that his lawyer
was ineffective for failing to retain a DNA expert and failing to ask
for the raw data supporting the state DNA expert’s report.175 The court
laid down part of the appropriate standard, saying: The Strickland
standard requires the movant to “identify the act or omissions of
174. 28 A.3d 362 (Del. 2011).
175. Id. at 366.
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counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.”176 But, it never went on to define “professionally
competent” and it never considered where to find any barometer of
professional competence.
In Rodriguez v. Knipp,177 the defendant claimed that his lawyer
was ineffective in not disclosing to him the prosecution’s DNA report
until after he was convicted.178 The federal district court specifically
noted the requirement that defense counsel’s performance be “unreasonable under prevailing professional standards,” and, again, never
sought out what those prevailing professional standards were, let alone
specify or define them.179
Frequently, courts would emphasize that trial counsel had wide
latitude in strategic decisions, and they would not second-guess counsel’s strategic choices. But, these courts never looked to any norms
external to the case to measure what was a professionally normative
strategic decision. Essentially, they would omit that part of the Strickland analysis.180
Not one court in the entire sample ever looked to specific external
professional norms in making their judgements. This universal failure
is particularly striking in light of the strong likelihood that most courts
themselves have little to no experience, judicially or otherwise, with
the minimal conduct necessary to try a DNA case, let alone what the
best practices would be. No court in the sample here made reference
to a single external reference in determining the prevailing professional norms, including those very few courts that even made a reference to such norms.
2. Deference and Double Deference
Strickland made abundantly clear that courts were to lend deference to trial counsel as they measured counsels’ performance. As
noted above, wide latitude was due counsel in the strategic choices
they made in recognition of the many different a successful ways
counsel may try a case.181 There was to be no second-guessing, back176. Id. at 383.
177. No. CV 12-2901, 2013 WL 1397461 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2013).
178. Id. at *5.
179. Id.
180. See People v. Garcia, 939 N.E.2d 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Commonwealth v. Morgan,
899 N.E.2d 770 (Mass. 2009); Payne v. Washington, No. 11-cv-325, 2017 WL 780840 (W.D. Mich.
Mar. 1, 2017).
181. See supra Part I.
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seat-driving, or Monday-morning-quarterbacking. The reviewing
court was to place itself in the position of counsel at the moment of
the decision(s) under review, knowing that no case could be tried perfectly. The Strickland standard, in effect, was only setting the most
minimum of performance bar. It was not setting the bar for what was
quality lawyering. For the Strickland Court, attentiveness was due
only to the Sixth Amendment concern of outside-the-wide-range lawyering that produced unjust results, not to the overlapping concern of
incentivizing a better quality of lawyering.182
Most courts in the sample relied heavily on the deference standard
in some fashion. Some articulated it in a very summary fashion.183
Others did a deeper analysis before concluding that the presumption
had been pierced.184 Some relied on the failure of the petitioner/defendant to make an actual evidentiary showing of ineffectiveness that
would pierce the presumption.185 Some relied on the “could have decided” strategy, i.e., speculating on an empty record that counsel could
have had this or that strategic reason for their conduct.186 And, not
infrequently, courts would rely on a combination of the above.187
For example, in Aaron v. Scutt,188 the petitioner initially raised a
claim in state court that their counsel’s failure to pursue DNA testing
constituted ineffectiveness.189 The federal court, in reviewing the petitioner’s subsequent habeas petition, quickly and summarily articulated a number of reasons the petitioner’s claim failed:
Counsel may have reasonably concluded that such testing
could be inculpatory and that the better strategy was to challenge the lack of physical evidence linking Petitioner to the
182. I appreciate that, in theory, whatever Strickland established as the minimum performance
standard had a significant indirect effect on how lawyers would choose to perform in cases. The
debate around guidelines versus more firm standards, in part, captures the Court’s adamancy in not
playing the role of “supervising” the quality of lawyering except at the extremes. That said, given
the equally pliant standards in the areas of legal malpractice and the ethics of poor lawyering, little
legal incentive exists for lawyers to engage in quality lawyering. Perhaps, this reflects a semi-conscious reliance on the economics of legal practice: the better a lawyer you are, the more money you
make.
183. See, e.g., Wilson v. Knipp, 85 F. Supp. 3d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
184. See, e.g., Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344, 362 (6th Cir. 2007).
185. See, e.g., Holloway v. Sisto, No. C 06-05545, 2010 WL 1293206 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
2010).
186. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011).
187. See, e.g., Garcia v. Thaler, No. 12-CV-00256, 2013 WL 2368309 (S.D. Tex. May 29,
2013).
188. No. 11-CV-11147, 2013 WL 6182771 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2013).
189. Id. at *13.
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crime and the quality of the police investigation. Counsel’s
strategic decision is “due a heavy measure of deference.” [citation omitted]. Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that any
such tests would have exonerated him or otherwise benefitted his defense. His conclusory allegations are insufficient to
demonstrate prejudice.190
The heavy measure of deference places the burden on the petitioner to
produce actual evidence and to eliminate all possible, even unarticulated, reasons for the strategic decisions not to seek testing.
The counsel-could-have standard—a variant of the basic deference test—appeared frequently in courts’ analyses. In People v.
Jones,191 the court was evaluating defendant’s claim that counsel was
ineffective in stipulating to the prosecution’s DNA evidence.192 It said,
Further, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel made
sound strategic decisions. Considering the results of the
DNA test that linked defendant’s DNA to the victim, defense
counsel could have reasonably decided that stipulating to the
admission of these results would avoid focusing the jury’s
attention on this damaging evidence.193
The use of the deferential counsel-could-have standard rendered
the court’s analysis a short, analytically light analysis. Notably, such
an analysis also implicitly presumes counsel did a sufficient investigation of the prosecution’s DNA evidence to support their decision to
stipulate to, rather than challenge, the DNA evidence.194
By way of contrast, some courts produced an extended analytical
explanation assessing both the standard and the circumstances of the
case. The court in Chambers v. Beard,195 in accepting the Magistrate
judge’s recommendation, did an analysis both of the law and the case
facts before denying the habeas petition:
There is a strong presumption that counsel is effective and
the courts, guarding against the temptation to engage in hindsight, must be “highly deferential” to counsel’s reasonable
strategic decisions. The mere existence of alternative, even
190. Id. at *14.
191. No. 305586, 2013 WL 4746730 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2013).
192. Id. at *6.
193. Id. at *7 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
194. See Garcia v. Thaler, No. 12-CV-00256, 2013 WL 2368309, at *10–12 (S.D. Tex. May 29,
2013) (laying out the applicable law and drawing a summary conclusion).
195. No. 06-CV-980, 2009 WL 2191748 (M.D. Pa. July 22, 2009).
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more preferable or more effective, strategies does not satisfy
the first prong of the Strickland test.196
The court then went into an extended analysis of the totality of the
factual circumstances of the case before denying the claim.197
The absence of a full description of the applicable standard and,
in particular, any subsequent analysis of the factual circumstances of
the case was not uncommon in the sample.198 To be sure, some cases
were “worthy” of summary treatment where the petitioner/defendant
stated vague or demonstrably meritless claims.199 Sometimes, an insufficient record existed to make other than a superficial decision using the deference standard.200 Some courts, however, did analyze the
specific circumstances of the case even in the absence of an evidentiary record from below. Many cases made short shrift of any significant consideration of the claim in reliance on the deference standard.
In federal cases, the double-deference standard described in Part
I was a potent deciding factor. That standard not only called for deference to the actual and possible explanations for counsel’s strategic
choices, it also cautioned federal courts in habeas cases to defer to a
state court decision unless it was contrary to established federal law or
an unreasonable application thereof.201
In Murphy v. Angelone,202 the court was short and to the point
about the application of the double-deference standard to petitioner’s

196. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
197. Id. at *4–9; see also Bradley v. Cartledge, No. 15-2705, 2016 WL 5539524 (D.S.C.
Sept. 30, 2016) (offering a detailed analysis of the factual circumstances of a petitioner’s IAC claim
before denying the claim); Rios v. State, 368 S.W.3d 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (detailing at length
the facts surrounding an appellant’s IAC claim and ultimately denying it); Byrd v. Alexander, No.
08 Civ. 0070, 2009 WL 10677100 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2009) (discussing the facts of the case and
petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim at length before denying it).
198. See, e.g., Flowers v. State, 799 So. 2d 966 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); Cave v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-CA-001865-MR, 2006 WL 3375206 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2006); State v. Kash,
No. CA2002-10-247, 2004 WL 190187 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2004); Cuellar v. State, No. 11-9900073-CR, 2000 WL 34234938 (Tex. App. May 18, 2000); Rodriguez v. State, No. 04-00-00770,
2002 WL 1022589 (Tex. App. May 22, 2002); State v. Rockwell, No. 00-1118, 2001 WL 194983
(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2001); Hernandez v. Kernan, No. 16-CV-1211, 2017 WL 3219965, at *6–
7 (S.D. Cal. July 28, 2017).
199. See Davis v. State, 615 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); Vance v. United States,
No. 05CR43, 2010 WL 3244875 (N.D.W. Va. June 25, 2010), report and recommendation
adopted, 2010 WL 3270107 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 16, 2010).
200. See Barstad v. State, 764 S.E.2d 453 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014); Worthington v. State, 166
S.W.3d 566 (Mo. 2005).
201. See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 740 (5th Cir. 2000).
202. No. Civ.A. 7:01-CV-00168, 2001 WL 34780568 (W.D. Va. July 31, 2001).
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claim that their counsel failed to sufficiently investigate items found
at the crime scene by means of DNA testing:203
In denying relief on Murphy’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Virginia court [the state court] applied Strickland, noting that the petitioner had failed to meet either the
performance or the prejudice prong of that analysis. I do not
find that the state court’s application of Strickland was contrary to or an unreasonable application of the federal standard
found in Strickland, nor do I find the state court’s determination to have been based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts before that court.204
Overall, the deference and double-deference standards resulted in
what is a very low rate of courts’ granting IAC DNA claims, at least
in the sample.
3. The Presumption when Counsel Chooses to Forego a Defense
One of the issues that shows up in the sample is how to analyze
counsel’s decision to forego a defense. In IAC DNA cases, it most
often occurs when counsel decides not to challenge the DNA evidence
and to adopt another defense, including even stipulating to the DNA
evidence. This issue is particularly fraught in IAC DNA cases because
of the underlying concern that counsel is avoiding the DNA evidence
because either they do not understand it or because they think, incorrectly, it is unchallengeable.205 The question becomes whether the IAC
standards used by IAC DNA courts can pick up this potential problem.
Strickland and subsequent cases are clear on how a court should
deal with this circumstance. The Strickland Court confronts how to
analyze the choice not to use a defense directly:

203. Id. at *2.
204. Id.; see also Wilson v. Knipp, 85 F. Supp. 3d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Accordingly,
the state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s claim is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Supreme Court law.”); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011) (“Our
review of the California Supreme Court’s decision is thus ‘doubly deferential.’”); Yarborough v.
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003) (“In light of these principles, the Ninth Circuit erred in finding the
California Court of Appeal’s decision objectively unreasonable.”); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556
U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (“Under the doubly deferential judicial review that applies to a Strickland
claim evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) standard, . . . Mirzayance’s [IAC] claim fails.”).
205. Part IV will address empirical evidence in which trial counsel has won a “not guilty” verdict or a dismissal in a case in which the prosecution offered DNA evidence. Part I discussed the
numerous ways in which DNA evidence can be challenged.
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[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law
and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be
directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances,
applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.206
Subsequently, federal courts have refined and amplified the requirement that a decision that renders a particular investigation unnecessary must be reasonable. In Andrus v. Texas,207 the Supreme Court
emphasized the importance of independent investigation of the prosecution’s case. It found a Sixth Amendment violation and noted counsel’s failure “to conduct any independent investigation of the State’s
case in aggravation, despite ample opportunity to do so.”208
Other federal courts have added more definition to the requirement.209 The Sixth Circuit has said that the problem in that case was
not that the lawyer had a duty to shop around for an arson expert, rather
“[t]he point is that Kluge [the lawyer] had a duty to know enough to
make a reasoned determination about whether he should abandon a
possible defense based on his expert’s opinion.”210 Other circuits have
agreed.211
The Fifth Circuit has been even more pointed in saying that
“Strickland does not, however, require deference to decisions that are
not informed by an adequate investigation into the controlling facts
and law.”212 The Eighth Circuit has also taken that approach in saying,
206. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690–91 (1984).
207. 140 S. Ct. 1875 (2020).
208. Id. at 1884.
209. See Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344, 363 (6th Cir. 2007).
210. Id.
211. Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1514–15 (11th Cir. 1995); Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d
695, 714 (5th Cir. 2000); Lewis v. Alexander, 11 F.3d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1993) (explaining that
a petitioner’s dissatisfaction with the “degree of his attorney’s investigation” differs from a situation where the attorney has not investigated at all).
212. Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 615 (5th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Drones,
218 F.3d. 496, 500 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Strickland does not require us to defer to decisions that are
uninformed by an adequate investigation into the controlling facts and law.”).
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“Although we generally give great deference to an attorney’s informed
strategic choices, we closely scrutinize an attorney’s preparatory activities.”213 It further explained this concern when it said, a “[t]actical
decisions must be made in the context of a reasonable amount of investigation, not in a vacuum,”214 and that the “measure of deference
. . . must not be watered down into a disguised form of acquiescence.”215
A close look at 26 cases in the sample in which the petitioner alleged a lack of investigation shows that, in at least 15 cases, the reviewing court did not discuss or implement the non-deferential
method of analyzing a choice not to investigate or closely scrutinize
counsel’s pre-trial preparation of the DNA potion of the case. In Garcia v. Thaler,216 the defendant claimed that their lawyer was ineffective for failing to pursue an investigation into the prosecution’s contaminated DNA evidence. The court rejected the defendant’s claim,
relying on the strong presumption and highly deferential standard of
Strickland.217 In Holloway v. Sisto,218 the court rejected the defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective in not getting the blood on the
bumper of a relevant car compared, via DNA retesting, to the victim’s
blood. It simply ruled that there was no evidence it was not a strategic
decision.219
The concern is that by explicit or implicit reliance on deference
or on a strong presumption in failure-to-investigate cases, the court is
likely to miss or overlook those cases in which defense counsel is
seeking to avoid dealing with DNA evidence due to fear or to lack of
understanding. The deference/presumption standards quickly become
a type of there-is-nothing-that-shows-it-wasn’t-a-strategic-decision
approach that will almost always fail to pick up that counsel is avoiding the DNA evidence and nothing more. Part IV will show that this
is a real concern in IAC DNA cases.

213. Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Chambers v. Armontrout,
907 F.2d 825, 835 (8th Cir. 1990) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“In contrast to the close scrutiny which
courts give to an attorney’s preparatory activities, greater deference is given to an attorney’s informed strategic choices.”).
214. Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 597 (5th Cir. 1990).
215. Profitt v. Waldron, 831 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1987).
216. No. 12-CV-00256, 2013 WL 2368309 (S.D. Tex. May 29, 2013).
217. Id. at *12.
218. No. C 06-05545, 2010 WL 1293206 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010).
219. Id. at *12.
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In the one positive example, counsel in Spagnola v. Haas220 did
an extensive investigation before deciding to move forward with a
“transfer” defense rather than attacking the DNA evidence head-on.221
In Sampson v. Clarke,222 “counsel vigorously cross-examined the
Commonwealth’s forensic experts, and this cross-examination emphasized the inconsistencies and inconclusive findings related to the scientific evidence.”223
An approach that subjects pre-trial choice-of-defense investigations, or lack thereof, to close scrutiny and does not over-rely on deference and presumption is more likely to pick up the cases that may
be troublesome in the way described above. Such an approach does
not set the bar too high for defense counsel. It does not require them
to do a rigorous investigation of every possible defense before deciding on the one best for the case. It requires only enough to make an
“informed strategic choice,” as counsel did in Spagnola and Sampson.
4. Failure-to-Test and Failure-to-Consult/Hire-an-Expert Cases
Another concern arises in judicial decisions in many of the failure-to-test and failure-to-consult/hire-an-expert cases. In the sample,
those two complaints were the most common ones raised by petitioners/defendants: 109 cases with failure-to-test complaints and 80 cases
with failure-to-consult/hire-an-expert complaints.224
The concern is that IAC DNA courts do little to examine whether
counsel truly was making an informed strategic choice when they
chose not to consult or retain an expert or not to arrange for original
or additional testing. As Part II shows, it is still the rare attorney who
can look at the one-to-four page DNA summary that they get and determine whether the testing was well or poorly done.
To investigate the DNA evidence in an adequate enough fashion,225 a lawyer must get the full case file from the forensic laboratory
220. No. 11-CV-10329, 2017 WL 1209097 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2017).
221. Id. at *7.
222. No. 15CV370, 2016 WL 5349479 (E.D. Va. July 15, 2016), report and recommendation
adopted, 2016 WL 5346076 (E.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2016).
223. Id. at *12.
224. The other types of complaints were: failure to make pre-trial or trial objections (69 cases);
failure to investigate or get discovery (57); bad cross-examination (37); bad advice generally or as
to a plea (24); bad closing argument (7); failure to present DNA evidence other than an expert (6);
mistaken trial stipulation (5); bad voir dire (1); and other (8). Many petitions alleged several of
these failings.
225. I.e., an investigation that prepares to attorney to make an “informed strategic choice” about
how to handle the DNA evidence.
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and either talk to another lawyer who has significant experience evaluating or litigating DNA evidence and/or talk to or retain a DNA expert to evaluate the testing already done. The failure to hire an expert
may indicate: a misunderstanding of the potential issues with forensic
DNA evidence; a fear of one’s inability to manage DNA evidence in
any depth; a blind belief in the incontrovertible strength of the DNA
evidence; or a version of all of these. Alternatively, it may mean that
the lawyer has taken appropriate steps to educate themselves generally
about DNA evidence and, in particular, about the analysis in the particular case.226
In the sample, some courts relied heavily on the presumption of
effectiveness in a way that resulted in no examination of the logic behind the failure to consult or call an expert. In State v. Elzie,227 the
court simply stated without any substantive analysis that the decision
not to call witnesses “was a tactical and strategic decision, not an example of ineffective assistance of counsel, and we will give great deference to trial counsel in these decisions.”228
In several cases, courts relied on the counsel-could-have rationale
without any examination of the circumstances of the case.229 Sometimes, that approach took the form of a statement that the defendant
had “failed to demonstrate that a legitimate explanation was absent
for . . . defense counsel’s decision not to retain an expert witness to
challenge the DNA test results.”230
In other cases, courts presumptively stated that the decision not
to call an expert does not represent ineffectiveness and left it at that.231
In still other cases in the sample, courts stated that a defendant’s claim
that counsel should have arranged for DNA testing failed because of
“overwhelming evidence to the contrary.”232
Another version of this theme runs throughout the cases about
failure to consult/retain an expert or get original or additional DNA

226. See, e.g., Perryman v. Valensuela, No. C 13-0311, 2014 WL 3963123, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 13, 2014) (explaining that original counsel consulted with another attorney who analyzed the
lab’s testing methodology and raised concerns and that subsequent attorney did not follow up nor
request additional testing based on those concerns).
227. 865 So. 2d 248 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
228. Id. at 256.
229. See, e.g., Rice v. Hall, 564 F.3d 523, 525–26 (1st Cir. 2009) (commending counsel for
putting on a “decent” defense and speculating as to why they may have chosen not to call an expert).
230. People v. Pottorff, 43 N.Y.S.3d 169, 172 (App. Div. 2016).
231. See State v. Stevens, 58 N.E.3d 584, 604 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
232. Johnson v. Conway, No. 09-CV-0127, 2011 WL 382734, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2011).
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testing. In Felder v. Goord,233 the petitioner claimed that counsel
failed to retain and have an expert testify.234 The court denied the habeas petition, stating both that the decision to call an expert “fall[s]
squarely within the ambit of trial strategy” and that the petitioner failed
to show what testimony a DNA expert would have offered that “would
have affected the result of his trial.”235
More dramatically, in State v. Simpson,236 the defendant claimed
that his counsel was ineffective because they did not have the DNA
testimony reviewed by an expert.237 The court denied their claim because “we do not know what such experts would have concluded, or
whether they would have aided Simpson’s defense, because his petition for post-conviction relief is devoid of evidence outside the record
from such experts.”238 Notably, post-conviction relief counsel had petitioned the trial court to appoint a DNA expert for the very purpose
of developing the record necessary to make the showing later found
lacking by the appellate court.239 The trial court denied that request,
and the appellate court affirmed that denial, saying:
We see no error in the trial court’s denial of Simpson’s motions for appointment of the foregoing experts in connection
with his petition for post-conviction relief. The short answer
to his arguments is that he had no right, statutory or constitutional, to the appointment of experts to assist in his post-conviction relief petition.240
The court then went on to cite a well-established body of law in support of the lack of constitutional right to experts for a collateral attack.241
Therein lies the catch-22 of many IAC DNA cases that involve
failures to call DNA experts and failures to request DNA testing.
Simpson is the clearest example with the denial of an expert accompanying the denial of the claim for a failure to show what an expert
would say. Yet, many courts routinely denied IAC DNA claims because the petitioner/defendant failed to make a record of what the
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

564 F. Supp. 2d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id. at 217.
Id. at 220 (alteration in original).
61 N.E.3d 905 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
Id. at 907.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 912.
Id.
Id.
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expert or the testing would have shown, thereby failing to establish a
deficient performance by counsel.242
The message becomes: (1) a defendant is entitled to a finding of
ineffectiveness (2) if they can show that the result of testing (3) that
did not occur (4) for which their lawyer failed to ask (5) which is the
basis for their complaint (6) is one that benefits them. The puzzle is
more difficult when courts like the Simpson court deny requests for
post-conviction DNA testing.
The puzzle is also more difficult in those states with post-conviction DNA testing statutes. The federal system and several states have
post-conviction DNA testing statutes that place upon a petitioner/defendant an additional barrier to get the testing courts require for an
IAC DNA claim. Federally, one seeking post-conviction DNA testing
must show a reasonable probability that testing will produce non-cumulative evidence that would help establish that the applicant was actually innocent of the crime for which the applicant was convicted or
adjudicated as delinquent.243
In Washington state, the petitioner must make a showing that “the
likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a
more probable than not basis.”244 In Pennsylvania, the petitioner must
show “there is a reasonable probability[] that the testing would produce exculpatory evidence that would establish: . . . the applicant’s actual innocence of the offense for which the applicant was convicted.”245 And, in Vermont, the petitioner also must show, “[a]
reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been
convicted . . . .”246
In states like Washington, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, then, the
effective set of hurdles require that an IAC defendant show with actual
test results that counsel should have gotten testing and also show that,
in order to get such test results, there is a reasonable probability that
they would be exculpatory.247 The only slightly too simple message is:
we will grant your IAC claim if you have testing that shows you are

242. See, e.g., id. at 909.
243. D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) (2021).
244. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.73.170(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010).
245. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543.1(a)(6)(i) (2021).
246. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5566(a)(1) (2021).
247. The showing necessary for post-conviction testing also requires an additional set of procedural hurdles in order to file the appropriate petition, most often without appointed counsel.
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innocent, but we will allow that testing only if you show you are probably innocent.
5. Lack of Availability of Counsel
Of petitioners/defendants, 53.2% were represented by counsel
and 39.1% were pro se.248 This suggests superficially that more representation by counsel occurred than the lack of a right to counsel for
collateral attacks and some direct appeals may suggest. However, the
case data can only track reported cases, and it is not practical and possible to track how many pro se cases were summarily dismissed due
to the lack of coherence, let alone the quality, of many pro se petitions,
appeals, PCR, and motions for a new trial.
The data also suggests that a petitioner/defendant was much more
likely to have counsel at the state level than at the federal level. Of
state petitioners/defendants, 73% had counsel whereas only 18.2% of
the federal district court petitioners/defendants had counsel, though
81.8% of the federal circuit petitioners had counsel. The data also says
that only 21.2% of federal habeas petitioners had counsel while 66.7%
of state habeas petitioners had counsel. In addition, 82.6% of directappeal defendants and 67.2% of motion-for-a-new-trial defendants
(both overwhelmingly state rather than federal procedural mechanisms) had counsel. The rough outline then shows somewhat more
counsel for state than federal claims and more cases with counsel than
pro se.
One had a better chance of winning an IAC claim if one had counsel. Of those fourteen petitioners/defendants whose IAC petitions/motions were granted, 85.7% had counsel and 14.3% were pro se. In this
sample, if you had counsel, you would win 8.4% of the time. If you
were pro se, you would win 1.7% of the time. Neither are great odds,
to be sure. But, given the complexities of successfully litigating an
IAC claim in either state or federal court, the availability of counsel
mattered.
***********************
The tension between the search for just results and the seeming
need for systemic screening captures the profound dilemma of IAC
DNA case law. Some of the issues identified above relate to a lessthan-energetic legal analysis by courts, like the failure of any sustained
effort to identify what the prevailing professional norms are, or an
248. In 7.7% of the cases, it was not possible to discern whether counsel was involved.
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over-reliance on the presumption/deference. Many of the issues relate
only to the substantive and procedural restrictions and hurdles put in
place by Strickland, the AEDPA, and attendant case law.
The systemic justifications behind these restrictions and hurdles,
standing alone, are rational. Finality in legal processes is important.
The autonomy of a criminal defense lawyer to try their case the best
way they can without the second-guessing of informed strategic
choices is important. The avoidance of an onslaught of frivolous IAC
claims is important. A measured respect by the federal judiciary for
the decisions of state courts is important.
But Josiah Sutton’s case captures in real terms the risk that travels
with these systemic rationales. The trial court denied Sutton’s motion
for a new trial.249 On review, the appellate court discerned that the trial
court had “implicitly” made the finding that Sutton’s defense lawyer
had enough reasons for not getting additional testing, though, apparently, the trial court did not explicitly articulate that factual finding.250
In doing so, it relied on a Texas case that said, “where a trial court
makes no explicit findings of historical fact, we presume it made findings necessary to support its ruling as long as those implied findings
are supported by the record.”251
In its prejudice analysis, the court also noted that Sutton had not
produced “any evidence of independent DNA analysis that would vindicate appellant or raise questions about his innocence,” nor was there
an explanation for why testing had not been obtained.252
This is a typical example of an IAC DNA decision. It is full of
presumptions that favor the trial court and/or trial counsel. The presumptions burdened Sutton with making difficult showings that, practically speaking, he cannot make, be it what the unarticulated factual
findings of the trial court were or that the results of DNA testing that
he had asked his lawyer for at trial and not received would be, if obtained. And the cases in the sample very frequently read like Sutton’s
case.

249. Sutton v. State, No. 14-99-00951-CR, 2001 WL 40349, at *1 (Tex. App. Jan. 18, 2001).
250. Id. at *2.
251. Id. at *1 (citing Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (where a trial court makes no
explicit findings of historical fact, we presume it made findings necessary to support its ruling as
long as those implied findings are supported by the record).
252. Sutton, 2001 WL 40349, at *2.

(10) 55.2_SCHERR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/5/22 2:06 PM

IAC IN DNA CASES

575

But the rest of the Sutton story is very troubling. Five years after
his conviction, a round of DNA-testing auditing of samples in the Harris County crime lab occurred, based on the Sutton case and other
cases. The DNA analyst in Sutton’s case had made a mistake.253 Upon
re-testing, Sutton was exculpated.254
The wall of substantive and procedural complexity facing a lawyer or a pro se petitioner/defendant is daunting. It very possibly has an
unintended negative effect on the system identifying DNA cases in
which ineffectiveness occurred. The empirical examination of a sample of IAC DNA cases suggests that courts may not be picking up the
kinds of cases in which lawyers are avoiding the DNA evidence out of
misunderstanding, fear, lack of knowledge, or all three.
Courts may also be avoiding a sustained analysis of IAC cases
with DNA evidence because of embedded and mistaken beliefs. It may
be that courts do not appreciate either (1) the complexity of DNA evidence and the need for experts who can help lawyers make an informed strategic choice; and/or (2) that cases with DNA evidence are
triable cases.
It is those suggestions that cause concern that defendants in DNA
cases may be the victims of ineffective lawyering; lawyering that
means they do not have a fair trial; lawyering that produces an unjust
result contrary to the fundamental goal of the Sixth Amendment described in Strickland. Part IV will turn to a different kind of empirical
analysis in order to evaluate whether evidence exists that these concerns are valid and grounded or purely speculative. Part IV will look
at what we can learn from DNA exonerations; from whether a case
with DNA evidence can, realistically, ever be triable and from those
cases in which failed IAC efforts in DNA cases have been followed
years later by an exoneration.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF MISTAKES AND SUCCESSES IN DNA
CASES
Empirical evidence from exonerations show that mistakes are
made in criminal cases that produce unjust results. Empirical evidence
from exonerations show that lawyers make mistakes that produce unjust results. Empirical evidence from exonerations also shows that
lawyers make mistakes in DNA cases that produce unjust results.
253. Otterbourg, supra note 1.
254. Id.
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Empirical evidence from exonerations also shows that IAC courts
do not necessarily pick up these kinds of mistakes, even in cases in
which IAC claims are filed challenging the lawyers’ handling of the
DNA evidence. Finally, empirical evidence shows that DNA cases are
winnable in spite of the seemingly overwhelming nature of DNA evidence.
It is difficult to empirically investigate poorly decided IAC and
IAC DNA claims. As the founder of The National Registry of Exonerations and others conclude:
We do not systematically discuss misconduct by criminal defense attorneys in representing their clients[,] . . . their misconduct and incompetence may do as much to produce false
convictions as misconduct by prosecutors and police officers
combined.
But we can’t. The failures of defense counsel are overwhelmingly sins of omission, especially the failure to investigate their clients’ cases. The absence of action is hard to
spot. A failure to even try to contact persuasive alibi witnesses will rarely be apparent at trial, and almost never when
a guilty plea is taken. Unless such failures are actually litigated—which is uncommon—they are likely to remain unknown.255
In spite of this challenge, a search for empirical evidence of mistakes in trials involving possible IAC issues, particularly those with
DNA-related ineffectiveness, is possible with a layered approach. This
section will examine evidence from exonerations in non-DNA cases;
evidence from exonerations in DNA cases; exonerations in DNA cases
that included failed IAC claims; and finally, whether DNA cases are
even winnable whatever the quality of the lawyering.
The combinations of this data suggest that wrongful convictions
are occurring, that some of them may be occurring in winnable cases,
and some of them are occurring in cases in which post-trial ineffective

255. SAMUEL R. GROSS ET AL., GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT AND CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORS, POLICE AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT 9–10 (2020),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Government_Misconduct_and_Conv
icting_the_Innocent.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6TB-PMNB]; see SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL
SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012, at 41–43 (2012), https://www.
law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88GA-KF2Z] (listing an exoneration in which we know that the legal defense was
severely ineffective, but only as an example).
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claims did not pick them up. Together, this evidence suggests a need
for better IAC standards.
A. The Evidence from Exonerations in Non-DNA Cases
Mistakes happen in criminal trials, mistakes that cause wrongful
convictions. Both the Innocence Project (“IP”) and the National Registry of Exonerations (“Registry”) have continued to document the existence of wrongful convictions.256 The Registry has documented
2,877 exonerations since 1989.257 The IP has documented 375 DNA
exonerations, including 21 people who served time on death row.258
The causes of the Registry exonerations cover the gamut of potential serious errors at trial. One Registry study found that 12% of the
first 2,400 Registry exonerations involved false confessions.259
Twenty-nine percent of the IP’s DNA exonerations involved false
confessions.260 Sixty-nine percent of the IP DNA exonerations involved some sort of eyewitness misidentification,261 and 30% of the
Registry’s exonerations involved some sort of misidentification as of

256. The Innocence Project both documents wrongful convictions and works with individuals
to investigate and potentially reverse their convictions. INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/4YJY-PBXA].
The National Registry of Exonerations “provides detailed information about every known
exoneration in the United States since 1989—cases in which a person was wrongly convicted of a
crime and later cleared of all the charges based on new evidence of innocence.” NAT’L REGISTRY
OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx [https://
perma.cc/KD66-MYLK].
257. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 256.
258. Exonerate the Innocent, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/exoner
ate/ [https://perma.cc/FG7F-PD8M]. Note that most of the Innocence Project DNA exonerations
are included in the Registry’s 2,877 exonerations. Many of the Registry’s exonerations are not a
result of post-conviction DNA testing. In addition, within both the Registry and IP data sets, exonerations exist in which more than one contributing factor are identified as being involved in the
wrongful conviction.
259. Age and Mental Status of Exonerated Defendants Who Confessed, NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Age%20and%20
Mental%20Status%20of%20Exonerated%20Defendants%20Who%20Falsely%20Confess%20
Table.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M49-LZWB].
260. DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/82RK-FU9N].
261. Id.
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September 22, 2016.262 Eight percent of the Registry’s exonerations,
jailhouse informants were used at trial.263
In cases more closely akin to DNA cases, wrongful convictions
involving some sort of bad or mistaken forensic science have also been
common in the IP data. In the IP data, 46% of the DNA exonerations
involved unvalidated or improper forensic science ranging from faulty
DNA analysis,264 like that done in Josiah Sutton’s case,265 poorly
based hair analysis interpretation, like that in Habib Wahir Abdal’s
case,266 or incorrect fingerprint analysis, like that in Clemente
Aguirre-Jarquin’s case.267
One study of the trial transcripts of 137 exonerees involving forensic science found that forensic analysts provided conclusions that
misstated empirical data or were unsupported by empirical data in
60% of the cases.268 More to the point, defense counsel either did not
make any objections to the invalid forensic science testimony in these
trials or did not effectively cross-examine the forensic analysts:
The presentation of forensic science testimony is typically
one-sided in the majority of states that do not routinely fund
the provision of forensic experts for indigent defendants.
Moreover, in cases where defendants are able to present expert testimony, the experts are sometimes inexperienced or
ineffective, and they may not have access to the underlying
forensic evidence. Thus, it should come as no surprise that,

262. Kaitlin Jackson & Samuel Gross, Tainted Identifications, NAT’L REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/taint
edids.aspx [https://perma.cc/X879-TNHB].
263. Samuel Gross & Kaitlin Jackson, Snitch Watch, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS
(May 13, 2015), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Features.Snitch.Watch
.aspx [https://perma.cc/AGP6-79FU].
264. Vanessa Meterko, Strengths and Limitations of Forensic Science: What DNA Exonerations Have Taught Us and Where to Go from Here, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 639, 640 (2016).
265. Josiah Sutton, supra note 3.
266. Habib
Wahir
Abdal,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/habib-wahir-abdal/ [https://perma.cc/QP6Y-N9VQ] (indicating that because the analyst had inadequate “empirical data on the frequency of various class characteristics in human hair,
it was invalid . . . to give statistics on the number of hairs needed to determine a match”).
267. Maurice Possley, Clemente Aguirre-Jarquin, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/cases/clemente-aguirre-jarquin/ [https://perma.cc/WAN2-6FAW] (explaining that a fingerprint analyst incorrectly matched Aguirre-Jarquin’s fingerprint with what was actually an “impossible to read” fingerprint on the knife used in a homicide case).
268. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2009).
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despite the stakes, the defense does not often meaningfully
challenge invalid forensic science testimony.269
The litany of wrongful-conviction empirical evidence is compelling,
whatever the cause.
The study, however, strongly suggests that, at least in cases with
forensic science evidence, the quality of representation is deficient.
Though the Strickland standard, by design, does not pick up every
mistake by defense counsel, one would have hoped that it would pick
up a large measure of those mistakes that are so serious as to lead to
the conviction and incarceration, often for long periods of time, of an
innocent person.
An additional look at the IP and Registry data as to inadequate or
ineffective legal representation also tells us how often some degree of
poor defense counsel performance occurs in cases that would later lead
to an exoneration. The IP data show that an “inadequate defense” was
a factor in at least 4.8% of its 365 exonerations.270 The Registry data
reflects that “inadequate legal defense” was a factor in about 27% of
its 2,891 cases.271 These cases include defense counsel who: failed to
call a key witnesses;272 failed to challenge the adequacy of the basis of
an expert’s opinion;273 failed to present exculpatory forensic evidence
at trial;274 failed to call time-of-death expert witnesses;275 and failed to
conduct an investigation,276 among many additional types of failures
in other cases.

269. Id. at 90.
270. See All Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/all-cases/1/#inadeq
uate-defense [https://perma.cc/JGL8-F29T].
271. Summary View of Exoneration Cases, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx
[https://perma.cc/D9ATRVDX].
272. See, e.g., Maurice Possley, Ezequiel Apolo-Albino, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS
(Nov. 5, 2016), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=
5014 [https://perma.cc/NY7N-MQVE]; Maurice Possley, Teshome Campbell, NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS (Sept. 6, 2018), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4829 [https://perma.cc/YZ37-EL5B].
273. See, e.g., Anthony Hicks, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/cases/ant
hony-hicks/ [https://perma.cc/DV7V-C83Y].
274. See, e.g., Richard Johnson, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject
.org/cases/richard-johnson/ [https://perma.cc/4B4C-XVAT].
275. See, e.g., Kirstin Blaise Lobato, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/cas
es/kirstin-blaise-lobato/ [https://perma.cc/77KE-CW5U].
276. See, e.g., Michael S. Perry & Maurice Possley, Reggie Cole, NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS (July 19, 2017), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedeta
il.aspx?caseid=3113 [https://perma.cc/5ZJP-RJZY].
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Exoneration collections like the IP and the Registry are indisputable proof that the protections from convicting the wrong person built
into the criminal system have not worked well. One of these core protections is the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel. Zealous advocacy by a defense lawyer plays a powerful role
in making that system work well to prevent serious mistakes. And,
IAC claims are the primary, almost the sole, backup that catches serious mistakes by defense counsel—in the words of Strickland, “errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”277
A look at 18 cases in which the Registry identified some sort of
forensic error at trial shows that in 13 of those cases, an immediate
post-trial IAC claim was either not filed or failed.278 Kevin Richardson, then 14 years old, was one of the “Central Park Five,” five young
men who falsely confessed to attacking and sexually assaulting a jogger in Central Park in 1989.279 Richardson was tried as a juvenile and,
among other evidence, “A forensic analyst testified that a hair found
on the victim was ‘similar’ to Richardson’s hair ‘to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.’”280 Mr. Richardson was convicted in 1990
and received a 5–10 year sentence.281 In 2002, another individual, Matias Reyes, confessed to the attack, and follow-up DNA testing corroborated his confession and established that the hairs found on the
victim were from Mr. Reyes.282 The positive resolution for Mr. Richardson did not come about through any IAC claim.283
In many of the 787 Registry cases in which the Registry determined that inadequate legal defense was a contributing factor in the
277. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
278. These numbers summarize an overall examination of such cases in the registry. Note that
in some of these cases, the combination of a forensic error of some sort and the ineffectiveness of
defense counsel was picked up after post-conviction DNA testing revealed the serious mistake.
Often, that occurred many years after the original conviction and after the involvement of the IP or
a similar pro bono organization. That delayed post-conviction representation did not come about
through post-trial appointed counsel filing an IAC claim shortly after the final resolution of the case
on direct appeal. See, e.g., Rob Warden, Dennis Williams, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS
(Oct. 22, 2016), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=
3744 [https://perma.cc/5ZZK-XVGF].
279. Central Park Five Tragedy Reframed in Netflix Series “When They See Us,” INNOCENCE
PROJECT (May 24, 2019), https://innocenceproject.org/central-park-five-tragedy-reframed-in-netflix-series-when-they-see-us/ [https://perma.cc/SCV7-75V9].
280. Kevin Richardson, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.law.umi
ch.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3578 [https://perma.cc/TG47-YSG4].
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See id.
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wrongful conviction, an IAC claim either was not filed,284 failed,285 or
only occurred much later as post-conviction DNA testing was done.286
In a number of these cases, the trial and conviction occurred at a time
when DNA testing would have been available for analysis.
B. Evidence from Exonerations in DNA Cases
In the IP data, a number of cases are present in which some sort
of DNA evidence was presented at the original trial, the defendant was
convicted and, some years later, subsequent DNA evidence exonerated them.287 Dwayne Jackson was charged with burglary, robbery,
and kidnapping The police had taken DNA samples from him and
found a “match.”288 The DNA evidence was the only evidence connecting Mr. Jackson to the crime.289 Facing a life sentence if convicted, Mr. Jackson plead guilty to one charge in exchange for the
dropping of other charges.290 Seven years after sentencing, the California Justice Department found that the crime scene sample matched
someone other than Mr. Jackson.291 Further investigation revealed that
Mr. Jackson’s sample had been switched with an original co-defendant
284. See, e.g., Maurice Possley, Keith Cooper, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (July 28,
2018), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5091 [https://
perma.cc/U6WX-X5EC]; Maurice Possley, Sharrif Wilson, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS
(Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=
4372 [https://perma.cc/8VND-RPTL].
285. See, e.g., Maurice Possley, Jerry Lee Jenkins, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS
(June 7, 2013), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4191
[https://perma.cc/53NQ-55AV]; Maurice Possley, Claude Brooks, Jr., NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS (June 20, 2017), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5152 [https://perma.cc/QV8V-KESJ].
286. See, e.g., Maurice Possley, Paul Browning, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Sept. 4,
2021), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5724 [https://
perma.cc/94EB-49MP].
287. See, e.g., Gilbert Alejandro, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/ca
ses/gilbert-alejandro/ [https://perma.cc/P4NR-Y59R]; Ronjon Cameron, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://innocenceproject.org/cases/ronjon-cameron/ [https://perma.cc/N9YL-2JZ6]; Maurice Possley, Ronjon Cameron, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.law.um
ich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4802 [https://perma.cc/U4CN-ZBRW];
Dwayne Jackson, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/dwayne-jackson/
[https://perma.cc/5G34-DKXZ]; Christopher Miller, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenc
eproject.org/cases/christopher-miller/
[https://perma.cc/5W9F-PB9J];
Marlon
Pendleton,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/cases/marlon-pendleton/ [https://perma.cc/A3Z
F-28EA].
288. Maurice Possley, Dwayne Jackson, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.
law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3821 [https://perma.cc/E966FYDM].
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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(who had been exculpated by DNA testing) at some point by a lab
technician.292
Marlon Pendleton was charged with sexual assault and robbery
after the victim, six months after the incident, saw a police sketch on
TV and thought that the man was the one who assaulted her.293 She
confirmed this by picking Mr. Pendleton out of a lineup.294 The forensic analyst said there was not enough of a sample for DNA testing, and
Mr. Pendleton was convicted.295 After serving 10 years in jail, Mr.
Pendleton was exonerated when it turned out that enough of a sample
existed for testing.296 No evidence existed that an IAC claim was filed
upon his conviction.297
We do not know with any degree of certainty why in most of these
cases why IAC claims were not filed. It could be because the defendant was unaware of that option or was unable to manage the daunting
procedural process accompanying filing and litigating an IAC claim.
It could be that they did not have a lawyer to assist in navigating the
IAC procedural process. We do not know, with any degree of certainty, why, in some of these cases, the court ruling on an IAC motion
was because of the demanding substantive and procedural strictures of
the Strickland standard in state or federal courts. What we do know is
that the data certainly implicates the fundamental quality of the lawyering occurring in many of these exonerations, particularly in cases
involving forensics and/or DNA evidence.
Another study of “inadequate legal defense” in Registry exonerations cases found that 381 (23.4%) of the first 1,635 Registry cases
involved inadequate legal defense as a contributing factor of a wrongful conviction, 36 of which noted inadequate legal defense as the sole
contributing factor.298 Importantly, many of those cases were not overturned based on a judicial determination of ineffectiveness under the
Sixth Amendment.299 This finding represents a stronger and more
292. Id.
293. Rob Warden, Marlon Pendleton, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (May 12, 2020),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3529
[https://perma.cc/5S5E-CLKS].
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See Marlon Pendleton, supra note 287.
298. Rosa Ellis Greenbaum, Investigating Innocence: Comprehensive Pre-Trial Defense Investigation to Prevent Wrongful Convictions 13 (2019) (Master’s thesis, University of California, Irvine) (eScholarship).
299. Id. at 13–14.
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focused conclusion that the Strickland standard is not picking up ineffectiveness, be it because of the strictness of the standard, the procedural hurdles, or the lack of access to counsel.
The study also found that 80.6% of the inadequate legal defense
exonerations involved a failure to investigate as a contributing factor
and was the sole contributing factor in 34.7% of the cases.300 Additionally, 23.7% of the investigative failures involved a failure to investigate physical evidence, which meant the physical evidence “went
unchallenged or unpresented”;301 18% involved a failure to investigate
medical evidence, which meant a failure to investigate and challenge
inculpatory evidence or a failure to develop exculpatory medical evidence;302 and 4.7% involved a failure to investigate DNA evidence.303
As to the DNA evidence, in eight cases, defense counsel failed to request DNA testing for biological evidence.304
For example, in one case, the DNA results remained in the forensic lab, unrequested by defense counsel.305 More dramatically, Jesse
Miller, Jr. was tried and convicted twice in Florida based on forensic
DNA testimony that “incontrovertibly placed Miller at the crime
scene.”306 At his third trial, new defense counsel had hired an independent expert to challenge the state’s DNA analysis.307 Miller was
acquitted.308
The conclusion that failures to investigate are a substantial problem in inadequate legal defense exonerations returns us to the challenges in the strictures of Strickland jurisprudence. Recall Cullen v.
300. Id. at 17.
301. Id. at 18, 22–23; see, e.g., Maurice Possley, Jerry Jamaal Jones, NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedeta
il.aspx?caseid=4136 [https://perma.cc/C9VL-A7AP].
302. Greenbaum, supra note 298, at 27–28; see, e.g., Maurice Possley, Debbie Loveless, NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3393 [https://perma.cc/J3CZ-97AN].
303. Greenbaum, supra note 298, at 30; see, e.g., Maurice Possley, Cheydrick Britt, NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4309 [https://perma.cc/G263-QSEL].
304. Greenbaum, supra note 298, at 30; see, e.g., Maurice Possley, Cheydrick Britt, supra note
303.
305. Greenbaum, supra note 298, at 30; see Rob Warden, Lafonso Rollins, NAT’L REGISTRY
OF EXONERATIONS (May 12, 2020), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/cased
etail.aspx?caseid=3596 [https://perma.cc/LDX9-TZN7].
306. Greenbaum, supra note 298, at 30–31.
307. Id.
308. Id.; Marc Freeman, Palm Beach County Jury Acquits Man in 1999 Chick-Fil-A Murder,
SUN SENTINEL (June 30, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20210628174623/https:/www.sunsentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2014-06-30-fl-jesse-lee-miller-trial-closes-20140630-story.html.
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Pinholster in which the Supreme Court reprised the Strickland warning that a strong presumption exists that counsel has made all significant decisions through the exercise of their professional judgment.309
A court must “affirmatively entertain the range of possible ‘reasons
Pinholster’s counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.’”310 Recall also that, in a federal habeas corpus IAC claim, the court applies
a doubly deferential approach to the state court’s decision.311
And, finally, recall that only some DNA IAC courts had looked
beyond the presumption that counsel’s failure to investigate was a strategic choice in order to investigate whether that failure was an informed decision. In the 26 DNA IAC cases in the sample in which the
petitioner/defendant alleged a failure to investigate, in at least 15
cases, the reviewing court did not discuss or implement the non-deferential method of analyzing a choice not to investigate or closely
scrutinize counsel’s pre-trial preparation of the DNA portion of the
case.312
Many of the inadequate-legal-defense exonerations in the Registry cases did not have successful IAC challenges.313 Many of the other
exoneration cases in this section did not have successful, or any, IAC
claims.314 Strickland’s failed effort to regulate the frequency of serious
mistakes calls into question whether counsel is even functioning at all
in these cases.
C. DNA Exonerations in Testing-Requested Cases with Failed IAC
Claims.
The most compelling evidence that the regulatory effect of the
Strickland standard is not working is in those cases like Josiah Sutton’s, in which the prosecution presented DNA evidence at trial; the
defendant was convicted; then filed an IAC claim and lost, only to
later be exonerated by DNA testing.315 In Sutton’s case in particular,
he had requested additional DNA testing for trial and his counsel failed
to follow up on that request.316 His post-trial IAC claim citing
309. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011).
310. Id. at 196 (quoting Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 692 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting)).
311. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009).
312. See supra Section I.C.
313. See supra Section IV.B
314. See supra text accompanying notes 297–298 and 302–303.
315. Khanna & Glenn, supra note 24.
316. Otterbourg, supra note 1.
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counsel’s failure to do so was unsuccessful; yet, new DNA testing exonerated him later.317
In Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go
Wrong, Brandon Garrett presents a wealth of information about the
IP’s first 250 DNA exonerations.318 Through an examination of trial
transcripts in 88% of those cases,319 he identifies 153 exonerations in
which forensic testimony was a part of the trial record.320 In 61% (93)
of those cases that eventually resulted in exonerations, invalid forensic
testimony was presented.321
To sharpen the point, he identifies 12 cases that ended with DNA
exonerations in which trial counsel did not request what would have
been exculpatory DNA testing that was then available.322 In only four
of those cases (including Josiah Sutton’s case), did the defendants
even file IAC claims and in three of those four their claims were denied.323 Only Anthony Hicks’ IAC claim was granted.324
In one of those cases, Brian Piszczek was charged with rape, felonious assault, and burglary after the victim, two months after the incident, identified him from a photo lineup as well as identifying him
as her assailant during trial.325 Though his girlfriend provided him
with an alibi, he was convicted after trial.326 Mr. Piszczek then filed
an IAC claim, stating that his counsel did not adequately cross-examine the State’s expert and failed to request DNA testing.327 The appellate court denied the claim in a fashion quite similar to the denials
described in section II above:
We also find that Piszczek’s trial counsel adequately crossexamined the State’s expert. He was able to establish that no
317. Id.
318. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
GO WRONG 277 (2011).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 280.
321. Id. at 280–81.
322. Id. at 206–07.
323. Id.; Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 115–16, 116 n.232
(2008). In an earlier treatment of the subject, Garrett identifies those four as Brian Piszczek (Brian
Piszczek, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/cases/brian-piszczek/ [https://perma
.cc/8JNA-D5AZ]), Josiah Sutton (Josiah Sutton, supra note 3), Mark Bravo (Mark Diaz Bravo,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/cases/mark-diaz-bravo/ [https://perma.cc/4T7S
-U789]), and Anthony Hicks (Anthony Hicks, supra note 273).
324. GARRETT, supra note 318, at 206–07.
325. Brian Piszczek, supra note 323.
326. Id.
327. State v. Piszczek, No. 62203, 1993 WL 106966, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 8, 1993).
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pubic hair sample was taken from Piszczek, no fingerprints
were found linking him to the crime, and that tests done of
the seminal fluid could not conclusively prove that it was
Piszczek’s. Furthermore, it is not likely that the outcome of
the trial would have been different. Piszczek was positively
identified by Quelette. He perfectly matched the description
given by the victim immediately after the attack. Piszczek
has not shown that trial counsel’s alleged errors determined
the outcome of the trial. His third assignment of error is without merit.328
In October 1994, Mr. Piszczek was exonerated and released from
prison, where he had spent four years.329
In a case beyond the four that Garrett identified, Donya Davis was
charged with sexual assault in 2006 based on an identification by the
victim from a photo line-up.330 Analysis of the rape kit found that
“[t]he testing was presumptive for the presence of semen, but no sperm
was identified. DNA tests on skin cells from the victim’s thighs developed a partial male profile that excluded Davis.”331 Davis asked his
lawyer for further DNA testing comparing his neighbor’s son’s DNA
to the DNA on the thigh.332 Counsel chose not to pursue that option.
At Davis’ first trial, the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict.333
Mr. Davis was convicted in his second trial before a judge only.334 Mr.
Davis filed an IAC claim, based on counsel’s failure to get the additional DNA testing.335
On appeal, the court noted that the DNA offered at trial did not
implicate Mr. Davis and he was thus not deprived of a substantial defense by his lawyer’s failure to retain a DNA expert.336 It then closely
analyzed the circumstances:
Defense counsel’s decision not to request DNA testing was
likely based on this concern of creating detrimental evidence

328. Id.
329. Brian Piszczek, supra note 323.
330. Maurice Possley, Donya Davis, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4546 [https://perm
a.cc/3E9H-HL3Q].
331. Id.
332. People v. Davis, No. 282081, 2009 WL 2343155, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. July 30, 2009).
333. Possley, supra note 330.
334. Id.
335. Davis, 2009 WL 2343155, at *1.
336. Id. at *2.
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that did not otherwise exist. By not excluding Brown’s son,
defense counsel was able to create doubt regarding incriminating statements that defendant allegedly made to Brown
and propose that Brown was only trying to protect her son.
Defense counsel extensively cross-examined Brown on these
issues and defense counsel also argued during closing argument that there was no physical evidence that linked defendant to the crime, while emphasizing how defendant was excluded as the unknown donor of skin cells found on the
victim’s thigh.337
The court then went on to note that a post-trial motion for DNA testing
had been denied and that the defendant had “failed to overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s performance was sound trial strategy.”338
These examples offer up two conclusions. First, the previous discussion about the substantive and procedural restrictions of the Strickland standard becomes more vivid when viewed through the prism of
these examples. Courts are not drilling down on the details of the case
in their IAC analyses. They appear too easily to rely on the presumption/deference that Strickland provides in order to justify conclusions,
including speculation of why counsel may have acted as they did.
For example, in one case, the appellate court invoked the we-willnot-second-guess-tactical-decisions mantra without examining
whether the tactical decision was a well-informed one.339 In the
Piszczek case, the court resolved the Strickland prong-two analysis by
a quick survey of what it saw as other compelling evidence. Those
conclusions lead to unjust results, as proven by the subsequent DNA
exonerations.
It is possible that counsel in those cases were not ineffective, and
the defendants were still wrongfully convicted. But, courts are not relying on a set of minimum standards about how to try a case in which
the prosecution is offering DNA evidence or in which the defendant
has made a request for DNA testing. If such minimum standards were
in place, IAC courts could rely on them to guide a more structured and
deeper analysis of what counsel’s strategy and choices were. Then, we

337. Id.
338. Id.
339. People v. Bravo, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 52 (Ct. App. 1993) (depublished). See generally
Mark Diaz Bravo, supra note 323.
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would have a much better sense whether a wrongful conviction resulted because of counsel’s ineffectiveness or in spite of their effectiveness.
The second conclusion that these examples provoke is a rising
uncertainty of whether wrongful convictions occurred in those many
IAC DNA cases in Section III.A. In many of those cases, the defendant
asked for DNA testing or at least for the retention of a DNA expert.340
In the very large majority of those cases, the appellate courts summarily dismissed the IAC claim based on counsel’s failure to request DNA
testing or at least to retain an expert.341 Again, most frequently, the
courts did not engage in any serious, guided examination of counsel’s
possible failures, including a close look at whether such a decision was
an informed choice.342
The superficial lore among defense counsel and others who work
with those incarcerated is that “all” of them say they are innocent. It’s
an overly light response to the frequency with which that statement is
made. A court system will likely crash of its own weight if the case
circumstances of all such post-conviction statements were thoroughly
investigated. Therein lies the principle of finality, a principle which
draws a firm line upon conviction.
However, an IAC claim exists as an important means (direct appeals being another) to identify those cases in which serious errors occurred at trial by virtue of constitutionally deficient performance by
defense counsel. The empirical evidence in this section strongly suggests that something is amiss in the application of the Strickland standard, at least as to DNA cases. Courts need either better screening tools,
like minimum standards, or a better legal standard than that which
Strickland and its progeny present.
D. Empirical Evidence that DNA Cases Are Winnable
The principle of finality plays a role in the adjudication of IAC
DNA claims. When a judge first acquires an IAC claim on his docket,
they know that the defendant before them has been convicted. Often,
in the first instance, they were the very trial judge in the matter. If they
are an appellate judge, they know that the defendant has been convicted and they know the trial court judge has made a finding of no
340. See supra Section III.A.5.
341. See supra Section III.A.4.
342. See supra Section III.A.3.
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ineffectiveness—“double finality,” in a sense.343 Also, as described in
Part I, a federal habeas petition means that, at the district court and
circuit court of appeals levels, the judge confronts a triple or quadruple
finality circumstance. At the federal level, that layered finality is captured in the equivalent layers of deference embedded in habeas litigation.
We presume that judges experienced in the intellectual and psychological challenges of handling cases remain as neutral and fair as
possible. The criminal justice system would have little credibility
without that presumption. We never know, of course, the degree to
which that presumption is actually the case in every circumstance. The
estimable Judge David Bazelon captured much of this instinct well in
1973.344 In explaining one reason—a disturbing one to him—that
judges are reluctant to reverse convictions on the grounds of ineffectiveness, he said:
It is the belief—rarely articulated, but, I am afraid, widely
held—that most criminal defendants are guilty anyway.
From this assumption it is a short path to the conclusion that
the quality of representation is of small account. This may be
an important reason why appellate courts commonly require
appellants to show not only that their constitutional right to
effective counsel was denied but also that the denial was prejudicial. [footnote omitted].
This “guilty anyway” syndrome underlies much of the current push for greater “efficiency” in the criminal courts. On
all sides these days we hear the clamor for “judicial reform,”
which too often looks like a euphemism for dealing with
more defendants in less time. Why allow men who are
“guilty anyway” to clutter the courts with all sorts of difficult
legal and constitutional questions?345
I suspect that nothing has changed in the forty-seven years since Judge
Bazelon wrote those thoughts.
343. The timing of an IAC claim varies a good bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even
within a jurisdiction. In New Hampshire, for example, an IAC claim can be filed between conviction (as a motion for a new trial) and the litigation of the direct appeal, with the direct appeal placed
on hold until the IAC claim (if denied) joins the direct appeal. Sometimes the IAC claim is filed as
a motion for a new trial or a state habeas corpus petition after the resolution of the direct appeal.
And, that process is a description of only a set of IAC processes in one state. Great variation exists
around the country.
344. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1973).
345. Id.
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One of the central and mostly unstated premises of this Article
has been that cases with DNA evidence in them are hard. They are
hard for the prosecutor, the defense lawyer, the jury, the victim, and
the defendant. They are hard because DNA evidence is complex scientific evidence. It involves principles and methodologies rooted in
molecular biology, population genetics, and biostatistics. Like most
lawyers and judges, the prosecutor and defense lawyer very likely did
not go to law school because of their excellence in science, let alone
those topics. The judge very likely did not ascend to the bench, be it
by appointment or election—because of their excellence in understanding science.346 A number of studies confirm that jurors find DNA
evidence particularly persuasive, even more so than eyewitness testimony, according to one study.347 A Gallup poll in 2005 found that 85
percent of people polled found DNA evidence to be either completely
or very reliable.348
These factors make it very easy for a prosecutor, a defense lawyer, or a judge involved in a trial in the criminal justice system to conclude, at least unconsciously, some version of, “Well, it is DNA; that
means guilty; no chance of a trial victory.” When a defense lawyer
does that, it is the beginning of the path to ineffectiveness, be it an
instinct to plead the case; to find another way to mount a defense other
than attacking the “irrefutable” DNA or just simply a diminishment of
their level of commitment to the case. Therein lies one of the central,
implicit concerns of this Article.
When a judge has that same instinct, it can lead to a more superficial evaluation of an IAC DNA claim, among other risks attending
the exercise of sound decision-making by the judge. Therein lies a second central concern of this Article as revealed by the cases discussed
in Section III.A.

346. Randy Jonakait once wrote, “[A]ttorneys are reasonably bright people who became lawyers partly because they were afraid of science and math. . . . If so, lawyers will not examine the
scientific evidence with as much skepticism as they would other information.” Randolph N. Jonakait, Stories, Forensic Science, and Improved Verdicts, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 343, 349 (1991).
347. E.g., Dominique Clancy & Ray Bull, The Effect on Mock-Juror Decision-Making of
Power-of-Speech Within Eyewitness Testimony and Types of Scientific Evidence, 22 PSYCHIATRY,
PSYCHOL. & L. 425, 426 (2015); Joel D. Lieberman et al., Gold Versus Platinum: Do Jurors Recognize the Superiority and Limitations of DNA Evidence Compared to Other Types of Forensic
Evidence?, 14 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 27, 32 (2008).
348. In Depth: Topics A to Z: Crime, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1603/crime.aspx
[https://perma.cc/U989-SXYT].
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The instinct—“Well, it is DNA; that means guilty; no chance of
a trial victory”—is wrong. It is not the case that cases in which the
prosecution offers DNA evidence are unwinnable, whether before trial
or at trial. Well-prepared, aggressive defense lawyers win cases even
though the prosecution has DNA evidence in their favor. They win
dismissals by successfully challenging the admissibility of the DNA
evidence under Frye or Daubert. They win better plea offers for their
clients by aggressively challenging the quality of the forensic analyst’s
work pre-trial and they win trials—complete and full acquittals in
cases in which the prosecution presents forensic DNA evidence
through an expert.
A sampling of criminal defense lawyers around the country confirms this point. The sample includes 49 cases in which the prosecution presented or was going to present DNA evidence at trial.349 Of
those cases, 30 resulted in acquittals after trial; 10 resulted in dismissals before trial; 6 resulted in advantageous plea bargains after challenges to the DNA evidence; and 3 were won on direct appeal.350 The
sampling does not offer up an overall percentage of DNA cases that
end in a favorable result to the defendant. That data is too difficult to
gather. Rather, the point of the data is that, whatever that percentage
may be, DNA cases can and do result in favorable outcomes for defendants, very likely through the effectiveness of the legal representation.
The most common issue raised by counsel in the sample of successes was transfer, the defendant’s DNA ended up on the incriminating item through innocent transfer rather than by virtue of the defendant being the perpetrator. The defense argued transfer in 16 of the 49
cases.351 In one well-known murder case in California, DNA matching
the genetic profile of the defendant ended up under the fingernails of
the deceased.352 Good investigation by counsel and subsequent highquality police work eventually brought to light that the defendant had
been picked up by paramedics earlier in the evening of the murder.353
One theory said that the paramedics had used pulse oximeters on his
fingers; another that they used other equipment in relation to the defendant and another said that they simply had some of the defendant’s
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

DNA-Win Collection, supra note 159.
Id.
Id.
Worth, supra note 141.
Id.
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DNA on their clothing.354 Whatever the actual circumstance, those
same paramedics went to the scene of the homicide and tended to the
deceased.355 At that point, the transfer occurred.356 The case was dismissed.357
In another case, the defendant was acquitted even though DNA
matching his genetic profile was found on handcuffs the victim had
said were placed on his wrists by one of three masked men, two of
them armed, who entered his home and stole $525,000. The state forensic analyst had testified that the chances of the DNA on the handcuffs coming from someone other than the defendant were one in
319.5 trillion.358 The defense argued that “DNA could come from
someone else who had had contact with [the defendant], perhaps years
before, and thus the DNA reading didn’t prove [the defendant] was
one of the three robbers.”359 The jury acquitted the defendant in 40
minutes.360
In each of those cases, the defense had other weaknesses in the
prosecution’s case to which they could call attention. But, without at
least the possibility of an innocent accounting for the presence of the
defendant’s DNA at the crime scene—through the efforts of defense
counsel—it is very unlikely the same result would have been reached.
In 6 of the 49 cases, the defense successfully excluded the DNA
evidence pre-trial as a result of a Daubert or Frye challenge.361 Most
often, the challenge was to the method of calculating population

354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Martha Neil, Murder Defendant’s Airtight Alibi Contradicted DNA Evidence, AM. BAR
ASS’N J. (June 28, 2013, 11:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/murder_defendants_airtight_alibi_contradicted_dna_evidence [https://perma.cc/8HVQ-QH2N].
358. Thomas J. Prohaska, Jury Discounts DNA Evidence in Acquittal; Short Deliberation Frees
Accused Home Invader, BUFFALO NEWS (Dec. 19, 2012), https://buffalonews.com/news/jury-discounts-dna-evidence-in-acquittal-short-deliberation-frees-accused-home-invader/article_b77f4c37-e03d-57cf-8ffa-02c0cd5334fc.html [https://perma.cc/LKZ5-ZZM3].
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See Unpublished Survey of news data from Cybergenetics filled out by author (on file with
author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #7]; Unpublished Questionnaire filled out by author (on file
with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #36]; Unpublished Survey of news data from New York
Daily News filled out by author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #38]; Survey of
news data from New York Daily News filled out by author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNAWin Case #39]; Unpublished Questionnaire filled out by author (on file with author) [hereinafter
DNA-Win Case #51]; Unpublished Questionnaire filled out by author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #47].
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frequency estimates, particularly in relation to mixtures.362 A few
cases involved an attack on lab or analyst practices.363 One case involved a challenge to the use of “low-copy DNA” in the forensic analysis.364
In 6 of the 49 cases, the defense litigated at trial the significance
of the presence of a mixture, either arguing that the DNA analyst misinterpreted the mixture or that an additional person other than the “expected” people (the defendant and/or the victim) was present in the
crime scene biological sample.365 Likely, the mixture approach successfully raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of jurors or in the
mind of the prosecutor. In one mixture case, the DNA evidence appeared to present a mixture of the victim’s genetic profile and that of
the defendant’s.366 The population frequency estimate was “only” 1 in
211,000 because the victim and the defendant shared types at several
genetic locations.367 The crime scene sample was taken from the exterior of some jeans.368 The defendant contended that he was not in California at the time and his cellphone records placed him in Spokane.369
Nonetheless, the victim picked him out of a well-conducted photo
362. See, e.g., Unpublished Questionnaire filled out by author (on file with author) [hereinafter
DNA-Win Case #27]; Unpublished Questionnaire filled out by author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #28]; DNA-Win Case #36, supra note 363.
363. See, e.g., Unpublished Survey of news data from New Times Broward-Palm Beach filled
out by author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #3]; Unpublished Survey of news
data from The Detail filled out by author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #21];
Unpublished Survey of news data from The Globe and Mail filled out by author (on file with author)
[hereinafter DNA-Win Case #23]; Unpublished Survey of news data from The Atlantic filled out
by author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #25]; Unpublished Questionnaire filled
out by author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #40].
364. DNA-Win Case #39, supra note 361.
365. See Unpublished Survey of news data from Yahoo News filled out by author (on file with
author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #9]; Unpublished Survey of news data from New York Criminal Defense Lawyer Blog filled out by author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case
#22]; DNA-Win Case #25, supra note 363; Unpublished Questionnaire from Aileen O’Connell,
Staff Att’y, N.H. Pub. Def., and Eric Raymond, Staff Att’y, N.H. Pub. Def., to author (on file with
author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #32]; Unpublished Questionnaire from Tonya Deetz, Att’y,
L.A. Cnty. Alternate Pub. Def., to author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #34];
DNA-Win Case #55, supra note 137.
366. DNA-Win Case #55, supra note 137. These facts are based on an e-conversation the author
had with the trial lawyer on the case, Samuel Leonard, from the Los Angeles County Public Defender’s office. What was particularly startling about the case was that when the types at each
genetic location of the three men in the second round of testing were taken together, they presented
the same set of types as the defendant’s types at the interpretable location—that is, a mixture of
four people’s types at several genetic locations looked exactly like one person’s types at those
locations.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
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lineup.370 The defense set about getting a re-testing of the rest of the
jean sample but, before that could happen, the prosecution’s lab conducted a different kind of DNA testing—YSTR (Y chromosome—
Short Tandem Repeats).371 They found that what had appeared to be a
2-person mixture was, in fact, a four-person mixture with an inconclusive result as to the defendant.372 The case was dismissed.373
In 12 of the 49 cases, some sort of lab error, mishandling, or police evidence collection error occurred.374 Most famously perhaps, the
defense in the OJ Simpson homicide case explained the inculpatory
DNA evidence as a product of evidence mishandling and tampering
by the Los Angeles Police Department.375 In another case, the defendant was charged with false report based on a claim that he made up an
assault when, in fact, he injured himself.376 The forensic lab analyst
testified that all the DNA results were uninterpretable.377 The defense
DNA expert testified that all the DNA results from samples taken from
the defendant’s wounds and clothing were all consistent with a male
attacker not the defendant.378 The defendant was acquitted.379
Not infrequently, these kinds of problems were paired up with a
transfer approach. In one Colorado case, the defendant was charged
with possession of a weapon by a previous offender and possession of
a weapon on school grounds.380 The firearm was found in a car on the
passenger seat where the defendant was sitting.381 The biological
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. See Unpublished Survey of news data from New York Daily News filled out by author (on
file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #4]; DNA-Win Case #9, supra note 365; Unpublished
Survey of news data from Forensics Colleges Blog filled out by author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #13]; Unpublished Survey of news data from OPB filled out by author (on
file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #19]; DNA-Win Case #21, supra note 363; DNAWin Case #22, supra note 365; Unpublished Survey of news data from Manchester Evening News
filled out by author (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #24]; DNA-Win Case #25,
supra note 363; DNA-Win Case #31, supra note 161; Unpublished Questionnaire (on file with
author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #45]; Unpublished Questionnaire (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #48].
375. DNA-Win Case #13, supra note 374.
376. Unpublished Questionnaire (on file with author) [hereinafter DNA-Win Case #49].
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. The details of this case are grounded in an e-conversation with a Colorado attorney who
has expertise in handling DNA cases. They handled the described case and related the details to the
author in an extended e-conversation.
381. Id.
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sample taken from the gun showed a mixture of four individuals’ genetic profile, one of whom was the defendant.382 During trial, the forensic analyst was reluctant to admit that at least some of the DNA in
the mixture could have come from secondary transfer; for example, A
shakes hands with B transferring A’s DNA to B’s hand; B then holds
a firearm; A’s DNA is transferred to the firearm.383 The defense expert
explained the concept of secondary transfer to the jury.384 The defendant was acquitted.385
The sample confirms that DNA cases are winnable for the defense
with effective lawyering. The cases are winnable by re-testing samples. They are winnable by calling defense experts. They are winnable
by using a transfer defense. They are winnable by challenging the
prosecution’s DNA analyst on cross-examination or before trial. They
are winnable by challenging the admissibility of the DNA evidence
under Daubert or Frye. All of these ways of winning, and more, appear in cases of all kinds—murder, sexual assault, weapons possession, even false report.
Notably, they happen in circumstances not readily apparent from
a quick or superficial look at the DNA evidence in the form of a summary report. They are also not readily apparent from a trial transcript
in which such issues were never raised. The case in which the defendant’s DNA was found underneath the murder victim’s fingernails386
would appear as a very strong prosecution case to the trial or appellate
judge hearing an IAC claim. Effective lawyering by DNAknowledgeable lawyers who are aggressive in getting underneath the
facts of the case as they first appear in discovery can win tough cases.
But on the surface, these potential defenses remain easily unnoticed.
The “guilty anyway” syndrome combined with the risk of “easily
unnoticed” defenses mean that the Strickland standard, with its layered
presumptions and deference, as it is currently used in DNA cases, is
unlikely to pick up what is actually ineffective assistance of counsel.
Tangible, minimum standards as to how to handle a DNA case to
which a reviewing court in an IAC DNA claim can refer would be
quite valuable. Such standards would act as a proxy for the court actually looking for the easily unnoticed defenses. A court could simply
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 358–362.
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ask whether the defense lawyer took a basic set of measures to investigate the DNA portion of the case. In the language of Strickland jurisprudence, a court would be able to evaluate well whether a lawyer
made an informed choice of a trial strategy.
*****************************
Individually, each of these slices of empirical evidence do not
conclusively establish that a system-wide, serious problem exists with
counsel performance in DNA cases that IAC claims cannot pick up.
The DNA-cases-are-winnable empirical evidence is of a different, more subjunctive, type. It documents to some extent the answer
to the question of what the result might have been had the trial played
out with DNA-informed and aggressive trial counsel. That said, it is
indirect evidence of the answer to that question. It suggests that these
are not the only DNA cases that could have been won and it suggests
that courts have no appreciation for this realistic outcome.
Finally, one must be careful not to equate those cases in which a
defendant has been exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing with
the presence of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland does not
require that factual innocence be at risk by virtue of counsel’s deficient
performance.387 A defense lawyer’s goal at trial is to establish a reasonable doubt as to the prosecution’s case, not to prove factual innocence. No doubt, many defendants have been acquitted who are not
factually innocent. Strickland’s approach calls only for an inquiry into
whether counsel’s deficient performance may have altered the outcome, rather than whether the performance resulted in a factually innocent person being convicted.388 Ineffective assistance of counsel can
occur when counsel failed to engage in conduct that would have raised
a reasonable doubt, whether the defendant was factually innocent or
not.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Strickland and its progeny built significant procedural and substantive hurdles for defendants/petitioners into the decisional architecture it created for judges in IAC cases. The Court called for strong
deference in the form of a set of presumptions as to the strategic decisions of the trial lawyer. It did not want to interfere with the autonomy
of the lawyer. It did not want to second guess their decisions. A further
387. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).
388. Id. at 694.
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hurdle operated if the case went to federal court where a court accorded state court decisions additional deference. In theory, the layers
of presumption and deference were balanced against a flexible directive for IAC courts to measure the lawyer’s conduct against standards and prevailing professional norms. That balance was to insure
that a lawyer would make informed strategic choices and a fundamentally fair trial would result.
The examination of a pool of IAC cases in Part III found that that
balance did not exist. Courts are, more often than not, analyzing the
claims superficially. Sometimes, they do not engage in the analytical
work for which Strickland calls. Sometimes, they over-relied, too superficially, on the deference built into the Strickland standard or the
double-deference embodied in the EDPA. Sometimes they implicitly
seemed to adopt an over-valuation of the irrefutability and power of
forensic DNA evidence. Perhaps most notably, they never referred to
substance of standards and prevailing professional norms.
These failings presented a real concern that defendants in cases
with DNA evidence may be the victims of ineffective lawyering.
Worse, the decisional architecture of Strickland was not picking up
that ineffective lawyering. Part IV investigated that concern and produced empirical evidence that wrongful convictions occur in the criminal justice system. They occur even in cases with forensic evidence,
and they occur because of ineffective assistance of counsel. And the
mistakes are sometimes not picked up by IAC claims. More specifically, the examination produced cases like Josiah Sutton’s in which
DNA was used at trial, the defendant filed an IAC claim that was denied, and years later the defendant was exonerated by post-conviction
DNA testing.389 Finally, the evidence showed that DNA cases were
winnable. Effective lawyering by DNA-knowledgeable lawyers can
win tough cases even though, on the surface, the potential defenses
remain easily unnoticed.
Judges in DNA IAC claims are too often missing the presence of
ineffective assistance of counsel by lawyers who do not have the understanding, knowledge, and experience to try DNA cases. They themselves are “ineffective” in handling IAC DNA cases. Absent the kind
of capacity to try a DNA case, lawyers make uninformed or ill-informed strategic choices. They fail to request full discovery of the case
389. Josiah Sutton, supra note 3; Sutton v. State, No. 14-99-00951-CR, 2001 WL 40349, at *1
(Tex. App. Jan. 18, 2001).

(10) 55.2_SCHERR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

598

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

5/5/22 2:06 PM

[Vol. 55:527

file. They do not consult with an experienced DNA lawyer or an expert. They do not request additional DNA testing. They simply choose
another defense without the necessary information to make an informed choice.
*****************************
Judicial “ineffectiveness” in evaluating DNA IAC claims is fixable. Judges should:
1. Follow Strickland’s command to consider the existing standards and prevailing professional norms for criminal defense
lawyers in assessing whether counsel’s performance was deficient;
2. More specifically, recognize that prevailing professional
norms for a lawyer making informed strategic choices in
DNA cases call for a non-deficient lawyer to:
a. Obtain and examine the full DNA case file through the
discovery process;
b. Engage in a preliminary conversation with an experienced DNA lawyer, an expert or obtain sufficient
training to understand and tentatively evaluate the issues the case file may present, regardless of the nature
and quality of the other, non-DNA evidence in the
case;
c. Explicitly consider retaining an expert for trial preparation for cross-examination and/or direct testimony;
d. Explicitly consider a request for additional DNA testing.
3. Dispense with deference/presumptions in evaluating an IAC
claim if the defendant/petitioner makes a showing that one or
more of the four criteria in # 2 above have not been met; and
4. If requested, require additional DNA testing and/or production of and an independent analysis of case file as a part of
assessing a DNA IAC claim if the defendant/petitioner makes
a showing that one or more of the four criteria in # 2 above
have not been met.
The adoption of these narrowly tailored recommendations will
open the door to identifying unjust results at the trial level without
turning those doors into floodgates that overwhelm the courts with
evaluating IAC DNA claims.
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1. Consider Existing Standards
The Strickland Court preferred guidelines that acknowledged the
wide range of professionally competent assistance, rather than adopting specific standards.390 In several cases, they have made reference
to a number of standards including the ABA Standards for the Defense
Function and the NLADA Professional Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation.391 By contrast, not one IAC DNA court in the
sample examined earlier made any reference to the ABA Standards for
DNA Evidence or to the NLADA Professional Guidelines.392
The ABA Standards for the Defense Function and the NLADA
Professional Guidelines both describe basic principles for competent
defense counsel representation. In the context of handling any case,
they lay out the basics of what a competent lawyer should do. For example, Section 4-4.1 of the ABA Standards, “Duty to Investigate and
Engage Investigators,” mimics some of the non-DNA Strickland jurisprudence in its emphasis on conducting thorough investigation for
the purpose of making informed strategic choices.393
These standards emphasize that an uniformed strategic choice to
devise a non-DNA defense is inadequate; that a choice not to investigate the DNA aspect of the case because of the overwhelming nature
of the prosecution’s evidence, a too common refrain, is inadequate;
and a failure to obtain any DNA discovery is inadequate. The NLADA
Professional Guidelines also emphasize the importance of investigation and of obtaining discovery in Guidelines 4.1 and 4.2.394 Engaging
390. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88.
391. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522
(2003); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367
(2010).
392. See supra note 167.
393. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-4.1 (4th ed. 2017).
394. For example, in a footnote to the Commentary accompanying Guideline 4.1 regarding investigation and obtaining material from the state, the Guidelines say:
Counsel must decide in each case whether defense testing will help the defendant or
merely corroborate test results already obtained by the state. But counsel’s decision
should be based on knowledge about the testing procedures in question, not on a mere
assumption that state test results are accurate. “Without such knowledge, we will consistently fail to impeach chemo forensic [or other expert] testimony based on faulty testing procedures.”
Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation: Guideline 4.1 Commentary, NAT’L
LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N n.24, https://www.nlada.org/defender-standards/performance-guidelines
[https://perma.cc/J7KY-T7AH].
Guideline 4.2 Formal and Informal Discovery commentary states that: “Independent investigation of the case by defense counsel, while necessary, is not sufficient preparation for
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in independent investigation supplemented by what information the
prosecution already has—for example the laboratory case file—is a
baseline for making informed strategic choices.
In recognition of the unique importance and power of DNA evidence in the criminal justice system, the ABA approved specific standards for DNA evidence in 2006.395 The standards are a broad treatment
of DNA evidence from practice of police, labs, and prosecutors to defense lawyers and courts. Standard 16-4.1, for example, focuses on the
importance on the provision of discovery, and 16-4.2 focuses on the
importance of the defense lawyer having the ability to inspect and test
the DNA evidence.396
Strickland also commanded that counsel had a fundamental “duty
to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.”397 As guidance, it said only that
counsel owed reasonable performance under the prevailing norms.398
The Strickland Court did not want to require perfect performance by
trial counsel. Nor did it appear to allow for “no performance” by trial
counsel. Its language captured a deference to prevailing professional
norms to find the kind of minimal performance necessary for constitutionally adequate performance. Part III shows that, at least in DNA
cases, IAC judges are not considering the prevailing norms at all when
measuring what constitutes the necessary minimally adequate performance, let alone deferring to such norms as a measuring tool.
Part II shows that DNA cases require a particular intensity of focus on a very specialized area quite different than other parts of a case.
It takes a measure of understanding, knowledge, and experience just
to assess what possibilities for the exclusion of the DNA evidence or
for an acquittal may exist in a case. An IAC judge should be assessing
whether a lawyer in a DNA case has the capacity and ability to make
an informed strategic choice as to handling the DNA part of a case. As
with the benefit of consulting standards, the benefit of consulting
determining whether to go to trial, or for the trial itself. Counsel needs to know what information
(whether correct or incorrect) the prosecution may be relying on.” Performance Guidelines for
Criminal Defense Representation: Guideline 4.2 Commentary, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N,
https://www.nlada.org/defender-standards/performance-guidelines
[https://perma.cc/8Y5UHU42].
395. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DNA EVIDENCE, at iii
(2007).
396. Id., Standards 16-4.1(a), 16-4.2(a), 16-4.3(a), at 81.
397. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
398. Id.
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prevailing norms is that the IAC judge has the means to assess in an
area that mixes complex science and the law that is either very unfamiliar to them or which has been informed only by a one-sided presentation at trial.
One example of how different and complex the area of forensic
DNA is lies in the practices of public defender programs around the
country. A short survey of 15 public defender programs reveals that
when a program begins to handle enough DNA cases, it dedicates specialized attorney resources to such cases.399 The Los Angeles County
Public Defender program, the Cook County Public Defender program,
and the Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C. each have specialized forensic units that handle DNA cases. Other programs that do
not have specialized units have lawyers experienced in handling DNA
cases with whom trial counsel can either consult or co-counsel. All of
these programs offer training or access to training as do programs too
small to have a dedicated unit or a cadre of experienced lawyers. These
various approaches to helping attorneys handle DNA cases are examples of prevailing professional norms in practice.
As Part II establishes, forensic DNA evidence is a sophisticated
and complex type of scientific evidence. Challenges that may lead to
the exclusion of evidence or to an acquittal are not readily apparent
from a case summary provided by the prosecution. Such challenges
are even less apparent to judges in DNA IAC cases. They are most
often limited to that which only one side has presented at trial. The
defendant/petitioner before them has even fewer resources than the
lawyer who represented them before and during trial.
Attention to standards like the ABA Standards and the NLADA
Performance guidelines provide an IAC judge with an ability to independently measure the baseline competence of a defense lawyer handling a DNA case. They don’t have to rely exclusively on that which
the prosecution has presented, a presentation that is, by design, onesided. They don’t have to depend on the presentation in an IAC petition or at a hearing by a defendant/petitioner without resources and
frequently without a lawyer. Standards provide a framework for a

399. The author surveyed a number of public defender programs around the country as to how
the managed representation in DNA cases. Those unpublished results are on file with the author.
The author also relied on their personal knowledge born of experience over thirty years as to how
some larger public defenders’ offices manage representation in DNA cases.
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better-grounded perspective on the impending decision. Prevailing
professional norms put meat on the bones of those standards.
2. Prevailing Professional Norms in DNA Cases
A number of sources exist for determining what are the prevailing
professional norms regarding constitutionally non-deficient counsel
conduct in a DNA case. The National Institute of Justice has provided
a valuable primer directly targeted at criminal defense lawyers, entitled DNA for the Defense Bar.400 It provides a comprehensive look at
what a lawyer should be doing in a case with DNA evidence. As noted
previously, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL), the premier bar association for criminal defense lawyers,
has over twenty CLE training sessions on video for both members and
non-members centered on litigating DNA cases.401
The website, forensic bioinformatics.com, has an extensive array
of articles, presentations, and other resources that identify the basics
(and more) of handling a DNA case.402 The literature on forensic DNA
evidence is extensive403 and includes basic primers for lawyers on trying DNA cases, like “Evaluating Forensic DNA Evidence: Essential
Elements of a Competent Defense Review,” and “Winning Despite
DNA: The Truth You Must Reveal,” both in the NACDL’s quarterly
magazine, The Champion.404 And, many public defender programs
host training sessions for their lawyers as well as other lawyers in the
criminal defense community.405
400. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., supra note 29, at iii. The 2012 publication was a product of the
work of defense lawyers, forensic scientists, and lawyers. It is one of a series of four publications
by the NIJ about DNA evidence in the courtroom including Principles of Forensic DNA for Officers
of the Court, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (2006), https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/principles-forens
ic-dna-officers-court [https://perma.cc/ZAS7-VL6A]; DNA: A Prosecutor’s Practice Notebook,
NAT’L INST. OF JUST., https://prosecutor.training.nij.gov/usermanagement/login_form [https://
perma.cc/9JRP-6GZW]; DNA for Law Enforcement Decision Makers, NAT’L INST. OF JUST.
(Jan. 1, 2010), https://nij.ojp.gov/events/forensic-dna-law-enforcement-decisionmakers.
401. NACDL Store, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAWS., https://nacdl.inreachce.com/SearchRes
ults?searchType=1&category=fddb39d3-01ac-4689-97e6-d9f57f641f4c&sortBy=recentlyadded
[https://perma.cc/L8Z4-3NFW].
402. FORENSIC BIOINFORMATICS, supra note 109.
403. See supra note 29.
404. Sheffield, supra note 111, at 18; William C. Thompson et al., Part 2: Evaluating Forensic
DNA Evidence—Essential Elements of a Competent Defense Review, THE CHAMPION, May 2003,
at 24.
405. Trace Evidence Presentation at Public Defender Forensic Science Conference,
MICROTRACE LLC, https://www.microtrace.com/trace-evidence-presentation-at-public-defenderforensic-science-conference/ [https://perma.cc/8S2Z-SCKG]. The Cook County Public Defender’s
office has held an annual forensic science training session which includes DNA evidence in
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These resources are excellent training materials. More importantly, they operate as a valuable source of prevailing professional
norms. A thorough analysis of their content reveals an emphasis on
four essential components to constitutionally non-deficient representation in a DNA case:
1. Obtain and examine the full DNA case file through the discovery process;
2. Engage in a preliminary conversation with an experienced
DNA lawyer, an expert, or obtain sufficient training to understand and tentatively evaluate the issues the case file may present, regardless of the nature and quality of the other, nonDNA evidence in the case;
3. Explicitly consider retaining an expert for trial preparation for
cross-examination and/or direct testimony and document that
consideration; and
4. Explicitly consider a request for additional DNA testing and
document that consideration.
A. Obtain and Examine the Full Case File
This requirement is the sine qua non of constitutionally adequate
representation. A defense lawyer cannot make any strategic choices
without knowing what options are available. It cannot be an “informed
strategic choice” to decide what to do about the DNA evidence without an examination of the complete case file. As William Thompson
et al. commented:
These records [the electronic files] can reveal a variety of
problems in testing that a forensic laboratory may fail to notice or choose not to report, such as failure of experimental
controls, multiple testing of samples with inconsistent results, re-labeling of samples (which can flag potential sample
mix-ups or uncertainty about which sample is which), and
failure to follow proper procedures.406

Chicago for close to twenty years. The author has been a presenter at DNA training seminars in
New Hampshire, Vermont, and Florida and has attended numerous DNA training seminars around
the country over the last thirty years.
406. Thompson et al., supra note 405, at 24.
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B. Engage in Preliminary Evaluation with Expert or DNAExperienced Lawyer
Obtaining the case file and reviewing it without the necessary understanding, knowledge, and experience is not constitutionally adequate representation. Such an approach will not result in informed
strategic choices. A defense lawyer must engage in preliminary conversations about the strengths and weaknesses of the DNA analysis
evident in the case file with an expert of some sort. That person may
be an experienced DNA lawyer or they may be a DNA expert. It may
be that the preliminary conversations and evaluation leads to a conclusion of no significant issues. But a conclusion that the DNA evidence
is un-challengeable and that another theory of the case has a better
chance of success without having engaged in at least preliminary conversations and evaluation of the case file with an experienced lawyer
or expert cannot lead to informed strategic choices.407
C. Explicitly Consider Formally Retaining an Expert for Trial
Preparation
Apart from preliminary evaluation of a case, if counsel decides to
proceed with undermining or aggressively attacking the DNA evidence at trial, they must at least consider retaining an expert or consulting with an experienced DNA lawyer in order to adequately prepare for cross-examination of the prosecution’s expert and/or for
presentation of their own expert.
While it is not necessary in all cases to call an expert to mount an
attack, at least considering this option, including evaluating the cost
and likelihood of obtaining the necessary funds for doing so, is important. Counsel’s documentation of their informed decision-making
process must include this explicit consideration in light of and with
reference to the types of issues they intend to raise at trial as to the
DNA evidence. Such documentation dramatically improves the ability
of an IAC DNA judge to thoughtfully evaluate the conduct of trial
counsel without deference, presumption, surmise, or speculation.
D. Explicitly Consider a Request for Additional DNA Testing
A request for additional DNA testing may or may not be the best
choice in the context of a case that already has DNA testing. In Josiah
407. Id. at 27.
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Sutton’s case, it would have saved him five years in prison for an offense he did not commit. In other cases, inculpatory results of additional testing might reinforce the prosecution’s case.
Whether it is the right choice in a particular case depends on a
number of case-specific factors: the revealed weaknesses in the prosecution’s case file; the availability of such additional test results to the
prosecution; the possibility as revealed by an investigation of the nonforensic aspects of the case that the DNA evidence is mistaken or has
an innocent explanation; the likelihood of obtaining funds for such
testing; the substance of counsel’s conversations with their client, etc.
Trial counsel cannot make this determination without the understanding, knowledge and experience to evaluate the existing DNA evidence and advise their client as to the risks of seeking additional DNA
testing. Gut instinct, assumptions and/or speculation is not a constitutionally sufficient replacement for at least an informed consideration
seeking additional DNA testing. And documentation of that consideration complete with an explicit evaluation of the existing test results
relieves the IAC DNA judge from making a decision based on deference, presumption, surmise, or speculation.
3. Dispense with Deference/Presumptions in Evaluating an IAC
Claim
Part III established that an over-reliance on defense and presumption resulted in a superficial evaluations of IAC DNA claims that were
likely missing constitutionally deficient trial performance by counsel
in DNA cases. The deference and presumptions embedded in Strickland jurisprudence generally have value in preventing second-guessing trial counsel’s trial strategies. But, if trial counsel in DNA cases
does not engage in the basics of constitutionally adequate representation as described in 2(a)–(d) above, an IAC DNA judge must directly
and explicitly consider the risk that inadequate representation has occurred.
Such an approach offers targeted and informed guidance to an
IAC DNA judge who may not be conversant enough in the specialized
area of forensic DNA evidence to make an otherwise informed assessment. The approach does not overly intrude on trial counsel’s prerogatives to make informed strategic choices. It simply establishes an explicit foundation for making such choices. And, in the longer term, if
IAC DNA judges adopt this approach, trial counsel in DNA cases will
engage in better foundational conduct.
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4. If Requested, Require Post-Conviction DNA Testing
An IAC DNA judge is not infrequently confronted with a claim
accompanied by a virtually empty record. By adopting Recommendations #1–4, it will become much more likely that the records in IAC
DNA cases will be more robust and thereby easier to make a wellgrounded and thoughtful decision. Too often an IAC DNA judge is
also confronted with the inability to make a grounded decision under
the second prong of the Strickland standard because the DNA record
is empty as to whether counsel’s deficient performance would have
made a difference in the case. The emptiness of the record for a second-prong decision is most often a result of the unavailability of either
collateral-attack counsel or an expert consultation for collateral claims
by pro se defendant/petitioners.
Additionally, an IAC DNA judge confronts a claim in which the
one-sided DNA evidence offered at trial appears overwhelming, perhaps in combination with other, non-DNA evidence. That one-sidedness may be a function of a deficient trial counsel that resulted in a
wrongful conviction, or, it may be a function of an actual overwhelming prosecution case. Access to post-conviction DNA testing would
also dramatically improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system. Forensic DNA testing is now inexpensive and quick. A judge
who orders post-conviction DNA testing will likely see a much
quicker resolution to the case than one who does not order testing.
Without testing, the probability of protracted litigation focused on imperfectly recreating the circumstances of the challenged legal representation increases.408 And without testing, the likelihood of a “Josiah
Sutton” set of circumstances without the dramatic, positive outcome
increases. Accessible forensic DNA testing in many circumstances
improves the efficiency and accuracy of final outcomes in the criminal
justice system.
Recommendation #5 in combination with #1–4 means that an
IAC DNA judge will ground their prong-two decision in many cases

408. An experienced forensic DNA lawyer who specializes in post-conviction litigation involving DNA evidence described a case to the author in which the defendant’s request for post-conviction DNA testing was presented along with an IAC claim. During several layers of litigation, there
were repeated objections by the prosecution to post-conviction testing. Eventually, a new trial was
granted based on the IAC claim, and DNA testing was conducted. The testing produced compelling
evidence that the crime scene sample was left there by the defendant. The repeated objections by
the prosecution and the bias against post-conviction testing in that jurisdiction resulted in a costly
and inefficient confirmation of trial result.
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in an approach other than that of an in-the-absence-of-a-record one. It
is important that a judge be able to take this step, if the record, such as
it may be, supports a finding that Recommendations #2 (a)–(d) have
not occurred. Though judicial economy and non-interference with trial
counsel’s strategic choices are important, the likely failure to pick up
conduct leading to a wrongful conviction without the application of
this Recommendation is more concerning.
*****************************
DNA cases are winnable before trial and at trial. Judges who evaluate IAC claims must understand the minimal foundational conduct in
which counsel must engage to assess how realistic this strategic option
is. Counsel must engage in this minimal foundational conduct. Both
must do so because we know that both unjust results and wrongful
convictions occur without such conduct.409
The extended analysis above also suggests that courts must take
a deeper look at how they assess all IAC cases, not just those with
DNA evidence. The exonerations cataloged by the National Registry
and the National Innocence Project combined with the analysis here
strongly suggest that deficient lawyering has occurred in cases that did
not involve DNA evidence or in which such testing was unavailable
at the time and that IAC courts did not pick up those deficiencies.
Particularized reasons do exist in DNA cases for ineffective performance by both lawyers and IAC judges as suggested above. But it
is likely not the case that IAC judges in non-DNA cases regularly refer
to the ABA standards or make an effort to determine the prevailing
professional norms. It is likely not the case that IAC judges in nonDNA cases dispense with deference or presumption when no evidence
exists of an informed strategic choice by counsel, rather than deferring
to speculative back-filling.
This Article demonstrates that, at the least, IAC DNA judges are
often ineffective in applying Strickland. Further empirical research
needs to be done to document and assess whether judges in non-DNA
IAC cases are engaging in the ineffectiveness found in IAC DNA
cases. A more fundamental inquiry into whether the Strickland standard actually accomplishes what it is designed to accomplish is also in
order.
409. For these purposes, an “unjust result” means that, with non-deficient counsel conduct a
not-guilty verdict probably would have occurred because counsel made a real challenge to the evidence. A “wrongful conviction” means a person who was factually innocent was convicted.
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An IAC claim invokes the Sixth Amendment. It represents a fundamental and unique protection for a criminal defendant. Without it,
deficient lawyering creates profound harm to a defendant that the legal
system leaves unremedied. Neither a legal malpractice action nor a
professional conduct complaint brings any remedy for that profound
harm. Without a well-enforced IAC system for picking up deficient
lawyering that caused harm to a defendant, the Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel renders a defendant an unarmed prisoner sacrificed to a gladiator.

